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LAWS AND SOCIAL NORMS: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
OF OBESITY LAWS 
Susan Yeh* 
Traditional law and economic analysis considers how laws directly 
incentivize socially optimal behaviors.  Meanwhile, a growing 
theoretical literature posits that beyond deterrence or incentives, laws 
also communicate normative judgments that can have effects 
unanticipated by classical predictions.  This Article presents empirical 
evidence supporting the broader legal theory that laws can express 
social values, leading to shifts in social norms.  Using data on 
adolescent peer networks in the United States, I find that where anti-
obesity policies are stricter, social stigma increases for obese girls, 
though obesity rates do not necessarily decrease.  These results are 
robust and consistent with a model in which the obese, in an anti-obesity 
policy environment, are negatively perceived as exerting less effort in 
their health than their non-obese peers.  I explore implications of this 
stigma. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Classical law and economic theory analyzes legal rules by focusing 
on their deterrence or direct incentive effects and by evaluating whether 
or not such legal incentives would produce socially optimal outcomes.  
At the same time, a burgeoning body of scholarship argues that laws, 
from public health policies to criminalization statutes to consumption 
taxes, can tacitly express powerful normative statements in addition to 
imposing direct incentives.1  Such laws are theorized to interact with 
people’s preferences and to induce a shift in social norms.  The concern, 
then, is that these legal statements motivate unanticipated responses that 
may enhance or impede policymakers’ original goals, depending on the 
social network in question.  While existing literature is rich in theory, 
there is a dearth of empirical studies on the law and economics of social 
norms. 
This Article contributes empirical evidence addressing the broader 
legal theory that laws express values and shift social norms by studying 
the case of obesity-related laws and their relationship with peer group 
norms.  Like many public health laws, anti-obesity policies typically 
have goals of incentivizing healthy behaviors to reduce health risks 
among the aggregate population.  But do such obesity-related laws 
communicate values that also lead to social stigma of obese or 
 
 1. Examples include mandatory sex education revealing an acceptance of teen sex as a norm, or 
priority flu vaccinations of children as revealing how the state values children’s lives above adults’ 
lives.  See, e.g., Robin Pierce, The Expressive Function of Public Health Policy: The Case of Pandemic 
Planning, 4 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 53 (2011); Kerry Taylor & Roxanne Mykitiuk, Genetics, Normalcy 
and Disability, 2 ISUMA: CANADIAN J. POL’Y RES. 65 (2001). 
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overweight persons?  Indeed, especially among female adolescents, 
social pressures to conform to norms in body weight can be significant 
in U.S. schools, and obese youth experience higher likelihoods of being 
bullied compared to normal weight youth.2  Beyond bullying, obesity 
stigma has been documented to translate to further disadvantages in 
society.  Relative to non-obese persons, obese persons are susceptible to 
discrimination and are worse off in education, employment, the 
marriage market, happiness, and health care, among other areas.3 
In policy terms, such consequences warrant greater attention as the 
obesity epidemic has emerged as a significant public health threat in 
recent decades.  The rise in obesity rates since the 1980s, particularly 
among youth,4 has spurred alarm not only about the health status of a 
growing population but also about the financial costs associated with 
obesity amid an increasingly expensive health care system.5  In 
response, lawmakers have proposed a number of interventions in 
society,6 such as levying taxes, requiring nutrition education, and 
revamping school lunches.  Previous studies have evaluated the laws’ 
effects on reducing body weight, though little is known about the stigma 
consequences. 
To formalize my analysis, I present a simple economic model that 
explores one mechanism of obesity stigma amid variation in health laws.  
A hypothesis is that anti-obesity policies that encourage taking 
responsibility of one’s own weight-related behaviors can further 
stigmatize obese persons.7  Namely, the model suggests that obese 
persons, in an anti-obesity policy environment expressing values of 
 
 2. See, e.g., Richard S. Strauss & Harold A. Pollack, Social Marginalization of Overweight 
Children, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 746 (2003). 
 3. See Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, The Stigma of Obesity: A Review and Update, 17 
OBESITY 941, 943–47 (2009). 
 4. Among youths ages six to nineteen, the prevalence of obesity has more than tripled since 
1980, with 16.5 percent classified as obese in 2002.  Combating youth obesity has emerged as a theme, 
most recently publicized by Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” campaign to promote healthy eating and 
physical activity. Learn the Facts, LET’S MOVE, http://www.letsmove.gov/learn-facts/epidemic-
childhood-obesity (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).  Heeding the advice of public health experts, Obama’s 
initiative emphasizes strategies to reduce cost barriers to healthy lifestyles.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Childhood Obesity Battle Taken up by First Lady, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A16. 
 5. The health consequences of obesity are costly, reaching $147 billion in 2008, or almost 10 
percent of all U.S. medical expenditures.  Eric A. Finkelstein, Justin G. Trogdon, Joel W. Cohen, & 
William Dietz, Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer- and Service-specific 
Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. W822 (2009). 
 6. Anti-obesity interventions may include educational campaigns on diet and nutrition; 
regulation of physical activity of schoolchildren, nutritional labeling requirements, and the so-called “fat 
tax” on soft drinks and junk foods. 
 7. See Taryn Parker-Pope, Fat Stigma Spreads around the Globe, N.Y. TIMES: WELL BLOG 
(Mar. 30, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/spreading-fat-stigma-around-the-
globe/. 
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personal responsibility, are negatively perceived as exerting less effort 
in their health than their non-obese peers.  Though this model of effort is 
not the only explanation of why obesity stigma arises, it characterizes a 
plausible mechanism describing how expressive health laws might 
motivate to real changes in behavior. 
Next, I empirically document the relationship between health laws 
with obesity norms.  Taking advantage of a nationally representative 
dataset of adolescent peer networks across U.S. schools,8 I analyze 
social stigma and academic outcomes of obese girls amid policies that 
are hypothesized to affect obesity.  For anti-obesity policies, I use state 
dietary and nutrition education mandates, which are among a broader 
class of programs directly aimed at reducing obesity among youth.  To 
be clear, this focus on mandates does not deny the powerful roles of the 
media and culture in stigmatizing persons who deviate from the “ideal” 
body weight.  Media effects are likely to be national in scope, though 
cultural standards may vary.  To minimize such biases from cultural or 
media influences, the regression analysis controls for demographic, 
school-level, and neighborhood variables. 
This analysis offers original evidence that links stricter anti-obesity 
laws to more obesity stigma.  To further develop the analysis, I consider 
how the law’s expressive effects vary by pre-existing norms, since 
underlying weight norms may differ by culture or by whether one is 
obese relative to one’s peers.  To implement this analysis, I employ the 
demographic composition that varies idiosyncratically across peer 
groups (cohorts) in schools. 
My results are consistent with the predictions of legal theory.  I find 
that obese adolescent women experience harsher social stigma amid 
well-intentioned policies that aim to reduce obesity in the larger 
population.  Where anti-obesity dietary education laws are stricter, 
social stigma increases for obese girls.  On the other hand, the education 
penalty that obese women experience is mitigated under anti-obesity 
laws.  I also find that efforts to engage in healthier behaviors are slightly 
higher under more demanding dietary education mandates, though 
obesity does not decrease.  Finally, pre-existing norms could matter; 
being surrounded by more white peers as well as being surrounded by 
more obese peers correspond to less social stigma from anti-obesity law.  
Taken together, these results are consistent with the model in which the 
obese, in an anti-obesity policy environment favoring personal 
responsibility over one’s own health, are negatively perceived as 
exerting less effort in their health than their non-obese peers.  While 
 
 8. In evaluating the social norms of health laws, school-based, peer network data are especially 
useful, since the lives of adolescents often center on school, where there is heightened awareness of 
social norms.  Robert Crosnoe, Gender, Obesity, and Education, 80 SOC. EDUC. 241, 244 (2007). 
4
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these estimates should not be viewed as definitive of a causal 
relationship, they do shed light on the law’s role in shaping norms and 
preferences, an area where thus far, data work has been scarce and 
costly to pursue. 
The implications extend beyond health laws.  The upshot is that the 
predictions of expressive legal theory warrant practical attention.  That 
is, policymakers should more seriously consider the social norm 
outcomes of laws, especially those that may vary by pre-existing norms.  
In the case of obesity, a shift in weight norms can manifest in 
educational or employment differentials, which lie outside of the law’s 
formally incentivized outcomes.  Thus, it may be more effective to 
calibrate a law by taking into account stigma effects that vary by 
subgroups. 
Part II gives background on the law and economics of social norms.  
Part III explains the application of the theory to obesity and presents a 
simple model of expressive obesity law and stigma.  Part IV tests this 
question empirically, describing the data and econometric estimation, 
and discussing the results in stigma outcomes.  It also considers 
educational and policy implications of obesity stigma and the social 
norm outcomes of laws generally.  Part V concludes. 
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS 
A. Review of Legal Theory 
Recall that positive law and economics theory is grounded in 
analyzing the direct incentive effects of the law.  To be more specific, 
this refers to the idea that the law can motivate an outcome by imposing 
costs or payoffs that make particular behaviors more attractive than 
others.  This idea is traditionally applied in the analysis of criminal and 
tort laws.  For example in criminal law, statutes that impose mandatory 
fines for driving over the speed limit are thought to deter reckless 
speeding by increasing the expected costs of driving too fast.9  In tort 
law, rationales for large punitive damage awards, such as in medical 
malpractice, state that such precedents would incentivize greater levels 
of precaution and deter future accidents. 
Since the mid-1990s, however, a substantial movement in legal 
scholarship has generated theories that recognize that laws can have 
effects beyond those expected from their “carrot and stick” approaches.  
Incorporating analyses of social norms, legal scholars such as Cass 
 
 9. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & Michael Greenstone, Using Mandated Speed Limits to 
Measure the Value of a Statistical Life, 112 J. POL. ECON. S226 (2004). 
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Sunstein,10 Richard McAdams,11 and Dan Kahan12 have categorized 
such non-incentive roles as the “expressive” function of law.  The most 
simplified version of the theory holds that such non-incentive effects 
arise when laws express what the government values or what it believes 
should be the social norm.13  For example, laws that criminalize 
marijuana possession can be construed as expressing the view that 
marijuana use is morally wrong.  The law’s role in conveying this 
message would be independent of its direct deterrent function in 
increasing private costs of marijuana possession via criminal sentencing. 
In terms of norms, the theory holds that the law can communicate 
what the social norm is, and in doing so, the law shapes individual 
preferences and behaviors.  Because people prefer not to deviate too 
much from existing social norms, they will adjust their behaviors to 
conform to the norm (or to come closer to a position that they prefer 
relative to the norm).14  This leads to compliance with the law, 
regardless of the actual or expected private costs of breaking the law.15  
Thus, criminalizing marijuana would convey the norm that marijuana is 
“bad.”  According to the theory, since most people do not want to be 
“bad,” they will refrain from smoking pot, even though the expected 
 
 10. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 
(1996) (characterizing this as “the function of law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling 
behavior directly”, and focusing on how policymakers might apply this function in changing social 
norms). 
 11. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 
340 (2000). 
 12. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).  See 
also Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil & Paul Slovic, Who Fears the 
HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural 
Cognition, 34 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 501, 502 (2009) (surmising that the controversy over HPV 
vaccination may arise from concerns that the policy would be “an expression of moral or political values 
unrelated to the efficacy of the vaccine”). 
 13. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 
(1995). 
 14. Sunstein writes that norms themselves are powerful in influencing risky behaviors such as 
drug use, cigarette smoking, and diet and exercise.  Sunstein, supra note 10, at 2033–34. 
 15. While most models predict compliance, it is also possible for expressive functions to have 
the opposite effect, such as inducing backlash against the law.  See, e.g., Daniel L. Chen, Vardges 
Levonyan, & Susan Yeh, Do Policies Affect Preferences? Evidence from Random Variation in Abortion 
Jurisprudence (2012) (manuscript), available at http://nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Abortion.pdf.  Or, there 
may be no genuinely expressive effects.  See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1375–76 (2000) (asserting that the existing expressive 
theories of law, which rely on law’s linguistic meaning, fail to prove that the law is truly expressive 
according to moral theories); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social 
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000).  Moreover, expressive functions or social norms can be inefficient.  
See Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1722 (1996) 
(arguing that social norms can produce negative externalities that hurt third parties); Alex Geisinger, Are 
Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 
ALA. L. REV. 1 (2005) (applying social and cognitive psychology to analyze when norms may be 
inefficient). 
6
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sanctions may not be harsh enough to deter smoking if a person does not 
care about being “bad.”16 
Further models and extensions more precisely explain mechanisms of 
the law’s expressive effects and the role of social norms.  McAdams’s 
attitudinal theory highlights the role of information and beliefs; it 
proposes that the law signals public attitudes about what behaviors are 
appropriate, that people will update their beliefs about these attitudes, 
and that they will comply with the law to avoid public disapproval.17  
Similarly, Dharmapala and McAdams write that laws reveal information 
about the riskiness of a behavior (such as a smoking ban revealing that 
the government estimates smoking to be more dangerous than the public 
thinks), and people will update their beliefs to incorporate that new 
information.18  Benabou and Tirole present formal microeconomic 
models that explain how laws may shift preferences as people update 
beliefs with the law; they propose that individuals will change their 
actions as the law informs them whether their prior preferences relative 
to the norm make them more likely to experience honor (or stigma).19  
Notably, game theory20 has also been applied to explain expressive 
effects.21  Both Cooter and McAdams, for example, highlight the idea 
that law reveals a “focal point” about the coordination strategy that may 
 
 16. Social scientists who study crime have also considered the “broken windows theory,” which 
argues that disorder in urban environments foster norms that result in urban crimes.  See generally, 
GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND 
REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 16–27 (1996). 
 17. According to Richard H. McAdams:  
[P]eople care about attitudes of approval and disapproval, but make mistakes about such 
matters; legislation is correlated with public attitudes so that the enactment of legislation 
provides a signal of public attitudes; and those who observe the signal will update their 
prior beliefs about public attitudes in the direction of expecting more disapproval for 
behavior the law condemns.  Expecting disapproval for the behavior provides an 
incentive, independent of legal sanctions, to comply with the law. 
McAdams, supra note 11, at 372. 
 18. See Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the 
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1 (2003). 
 19. See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Law and Norms, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 17579 2011). 
 20. In a game theoretic model, individuals choose the best strategies to optimize their payoffs 
given the other players’ best strategies; depending on the payoff structures, this may mean that a player 
is better off not cooperating with others lest he be hurt even more by other players who do not 
cooperate.  But under certain conditions, such as in a repeated game over a longer time horizon, the 
optimal strategy may be to cooperate with others.  See generally ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR 
APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992) (introduces basic concepts of game theory and their extensions); MARTIN 
J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY (1994) (provides mathematical proofs 
of strategic and cooperative games). 
 21. See, e.g., CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS 
OF SOCIAL NORMS (2006); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1649 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998). 
7
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exist among individuals in society.22  Thus, when people become aware 
of the law, they adjust their preferences accordingly in order to uphold 
the equilibrium coordination strategy and continue to maximize their 
payoffs overall.23 
B. Empirical Literature 
Despite this wave of scholarship, there exist only a handful of 
empirical studies that test the expressivist theories with real-world laws 
and data.  The following studies test the theories directly.  First, a key 
study by Funk analyzes mandatory voting laws over time and across 
cantons in Switzerland, where fines for noncompliance were so small as 
to render the laws “symbolic.”24  Observing that cantons that removed 
the voting laws saw lower voter turnout compared to others, Funk 
concludes that the laws had an expressive function independent of 
deterrence.25  Second, Fox and Griffin argue that the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) expressed negative messages about persons with 
disabilities by linking its enactment with a reduction in the birthrate of 
babies with Down syndrome.26  Third, Kotsadam and Jacobssen find no 
changes in attitudes about prostitution following the enactment of a 
Norwegian law criminalizing buying sex.27  Finally, Chen, Levonyan, 
and Yeh model changes in political preferences following exogenous 
changes in abortion policy across appellate jurisdictions and find causal, 
empirical evidence of political backlash, contrary to the standard 
predictions of expressivist theories.28  None of these studies, however, 
makes the case that they are directly characterizing norms shared across 
a population with a common network.  By directly analyzing the 
relationship between law and social norms using peer networks, this 
Article contributes original evidence where theory is rich but data work 
is scarce. 
 
 22. Cooter, supra note 21, at 586, 593–96; McAdams, supra note 21, at 1651–52. 
 23. Cooter, supra note 21, at 595. But see Posner, supra note 15, at 1713–19 (suggesting 
conditions where strategic behavior can undermine coordination and render norms inefficient). 
 24. Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting 
Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM L. & ECON. REV. 135, 139 (2007). 
 25. Id. at 138. 
 26. See Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 845 (2009). 
 27. See Andreas Kotsadam & Niklas Jakobsson, Do Laws Affect Attitudes? An Assessment of the 
Norwegian Prostitution Law Using Longitudinal Data, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 103 (2011). 
 28. See Chen, Levonyan, & Yeh, supra note 15. 
8
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/4
2012] LAWS AND SOCIAL NORMS 181 
III. OBESITY APPLICATION 
Social norms regarding body weight can be a very visible fact of life 
in the United States, with abundant media images favoring slimmer 
body figures and an extensive industry surrounding diet and weight loss.  
Yet recent years have witnessed growing alarm over an “obesity 
epidemic” in the United States, which is one of the heaviest nations in 
the world, in terms of average body weight.29  By now, the average 
American is overweight, and over one-third of Americans are classified 
as clinically obese30 and are at heightened risk of serious health-
threatening conditions such as diabetes and heart failure.31 
In view of these problems, policymakers at the national, state, and 
local levels have called for a “war on obesity.”  Recent initiatives have 
explicitly targeted childhood obesity, sometimes quite aggressively.32  
Georgia, for example, posted billboards announcing, “Chubby kids may 
not outlive their parents” and “Big bones didn’t make me this way.  Big 
meals did.”33  Most prominent has been First Lady Michelle Obama’s 
“Let’s Move” campaign, which was launched in tandem with President 
Barack Obama’s creation of a Task Force on Childhood Obesity.  
Calling childhood obesity a “national health crisis,”34 this campaign 
proposed to reduce obesity in a generation by encouraging healthy 
eating and exercise, as well as by monitoring the body mass index 
(BMI) of children.35 
Could such anti-obesity initiatives shift norms and preferences in 
body weight?  Critics have been vocal in arguing that official policies 
emphasizing the harms of obesity could further stigmatize obese 
 
 29. Obesity and Economics of Prevention: Fit not Fat—United States Key Facts, ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33929_46038969_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2013). 
 30. Overweight and Obesity: Adult Obesity Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013); Cynthia J. Stein 
& Graham A. Colditz, The Epidemic of Obesity, 89 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 
2522, 2522 (2004). 
 31. See Aviva Must, Jennifer Spadano, Eugenie H. Coakley, Alison E. Field, Graham Colditz & 
William H. Dietz, The Disease Burden Associated with Overweight and Obesity, 282 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1523 (1999); Ali H. Mokdad, Earl S. Ford, Barbara A. Bowman, William H. Dietz, Frank 
Vinicor, Virginia S. Bales & James S. Marks, Prevalence Of Obesity, Diabetes, and Obesity-Related 
Health Risk Factors, 2001, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 76 (2003). 
 32. See, e.g., David Crary, Amid “War on Obesity,” Skeptics Warn of Stigma, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, May 2, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42770308/ns/health-diet_and_nutrition/t/amid-war-
obesity-skeptics-warn-stigma/. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See THE CHALLENGE WE FACE, LET’S MOVE!, available at 
http://www.letsmove.gov/sites/letsmove.gov/files/TFCO_Challenge_We_Face.pdf. 
 35. See Learn the Facts, supra note 4. 
9
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persons.36  “Fat Acceptance” advocates maintain that initiatives like 
“Let’s Move” that put negative attention on obese children are likely to 
worsen their encounters with discrimination and bullying in schools, and 
later, at work and in society.37  In fact, one law professor blogged that 
the program essentially was communicating that “the way to stop the 
bullying of fat kids is to get rid of fat kids.”38  Despite the original 
intentions to improve health in the aggregate, “the claim can be made 
that it is in fact supporting childhood bullying, suggesting the 
‘otherness’ (e.g., size, shape, and/or weight) that children’s peers display 
or perform is not passable in terms of embodiment or by way of the 
implications of Michelle Obama’s initiative.”39 
These critiques highlight a real-world application of the law and 
economics of social norms to the timely public health issue of obesity.  
Certainly, observers have noted the role of social norms in public health 
interventions in general and that stigma surrounding some diseases can 
make public health policies a challenge to implement effectively.40  A 
legitimate worry is that persons infected with HIV may be reluctant to 
reveal their disease status and that the epidemic may then go 
underground.41  Skeptics of HIV disclosure laws argue that imposing 
criminal penalties for hiding one’s disease status might further increase 
the stigma of infected persons,42 while not necessarily reducing risky 
health behaviors as the laws were intended to do.43  These comments 
 
 36. See, e.g., Parker-Pope, supra note 7 (surmising that the emergence of fat stigma around the 
world may also result from public health efforts to promote obesity as a disease and a worrisome threat 
to a nation’s health); Jenny A. Armentrout, Sugar, Salt, and Fat: Michelle Obama’s Rhetoric 
Concerning the Let’s Move! Initiative: Binary Opposition, Weight Obsession, and the Obesity Paradox 
128-9 (Aug. 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation), available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-
pdf.cgi/Armentrout%20Jenny%20A.pdf?bgsu1307554274&dl=y; Crary, supra note 32. 
 37. Crary, supra note 32. 
 38. Paul Campos, Michelle Obama’s Let’s Move Campaign is Helping Bullies, THE DAILY 
BEAST, MAR. 15, 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/16/michelle-obamas-childhood-
obesity-lets-move-campaign-helps-bullies.html. 
 39. Armentrout, supra note 36, at 129. 
 40. See, e.g., Scott Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
179 (2002); Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, Obesity Stigma: Important Considerations for 
Public Health, 100 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 1019, 1019–20 (2010) (giving historical examples of disease 
stigma surrounding persons with cholera or tuberculosis). 
 41. Burris, supra note 40, at 179. 
 42. Catherine Dodds & Peter Keogh, Criminal Prosecutions for HIV Transmission: People 
Living with HIV Respond, 17 INT’L J. STD & AIDS 315, 317 (2006) (finding that HIV-infected persons 
perceive more stigma under HIV disclosure laws).  Cf. Gregory M. Herek, John P. Capitanio & Keith F. 
Widaman, Stigma, Social Risk, and Health Policy: Public Attitudes Toward HIV Surveillance Policies 
and the Social Construction of Illness, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 533, 533, 535 (2003) (finding that 
perceptions of stigma could affect people’s decisions to be tested for HIV). 
 43. Scott Burris et al., Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial, 39 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 467, 468 (2007) (concluding that HIV disclosure laws fail to “influence people’s 
normative beliefs about risky sex” upon finding no differences in risky sexual behaviors between people 
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suggest that understanding the expressive functions of laws is essential 
for improving health policy.44  By investigating whether normative 
messages of health laws could further disfavor obese persons in society, 
this Article addresses the need for empirical evidence on expressive 
functions of public health laws.  Below provides a background on 
obesity and explains the application of expressive law and economics to 
obesity. 
A. Laws Relevant to Obesity 
While a national campaign like “Let’s Move” has inspired public 
awareness, it is merely one of many anti-obesity interventions that 
policymakers have implemented or proposed in the past two decades.  
Certainly, consumption taxes and direct regulations on unhealthy 
behaviors have emerged, with variation across local and state 
jurisdictions.  Taxes on high-calorie soft drinks and snack foods, as well 
as taxes levied on people merely for being obese,45 have generated many 
debates, not only about their effectiveness in reducing weight, but also 
about the government’s appropriate role in influencing individuals’ food 
choices.  In light of anxiety about obesity rates, direct government 
interventions have included overhauls of unhealthy school lunch 
programs, mandates for dietary and nutrition education, mandates for 
more physical education, moratoriums on opening fast food restaurants 
in neighborhoods,46 and requirements to monitor individuals’ BMI.47 
 
in a state with an HIV disclosure law and in a state without an HIV disclosure law). 
 44. See, e.g., Robin Pierce, The Expressive Function of Public Health Policy: The Case of 
Pandemic Planning, 4 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 53 (2011). 
 45. See Matt Sloane, Alabama to Link Premium Costs to Workers’ Health, CNN, Sept. 19, 2008, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-09-19/health/alabama.obesity.insurance_1_unhealthy-employees-
screening-plan (reporting about Alabama imposing a health insurance surcharge on state employees who 
are obese or have high blood pressure starting in 2010); STATE OF ALABAMA, WELLNESS PREMIUM 
DISCOUNT PROGRAM, available at 
http://www.alseib.org/PDF/SEHIP/SEHIPWellnessPremiumDiscount.pdf; Crary, supra note 32 
(reporting about “Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer’s recent proposal to levy a $50 fee on state Medicaid 
recipients who are obese and don’t follow a doctor-supervised slimming regimen”).  Since 2008, Japan 
has also levied similar fines on health insurance providers who failed to adequately screen their 
participants’ waistlines or who failed to reduce them among patients whose waistlines exceeded the 
government guidelines.  See Norimitsu Onishi, Japan, Seeking Trim Waists, Decides to Measures 
Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, at A1. 
 46. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Panel OKs Fast-Food Curbs, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2008, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/23/local/me-fastfood23. 
 47. Researchers have identified factors contributing to obesity rates that could justify such policy 
interventions.  See generally Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Do School Lunches Contribute to 
Childhood Obesity?, 44 J. HUM. RESOURCES 684 (2009) (evaluating the National School Lunch 
Program’s effects on childhood obesity, with policy implications for reforming school lunch offerings).  
In practice, many programs’ actual impacts on obesity or improving health outcomes are open to further 
study. 
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1. Direct Incentive Effects 
Many weight and food-related laws are designed to discourage 
obesity by increasing the costs of unhealthy habits or decreasing the 
costs of healthy habits.  But unlike the most recent anti-obesity publicity 
campaigns, the majority of these taxes and regulations do not so 
explicitly promote negative images of the obese.  In that way, such laws 
may be more appropriate for testing expressivist theories because they 
allow us to differentiate more clearly between a law’s incentive function 
(e.g., raising dollar costs of unhealthy habits or lowering information 
costs of healthy habits) and its expressive function (shifting social norms 
or unexpectedly affecting social stigma). 
With the high health care costs of treating conditions associated with 
obesity, it is reasonable that the deterrence or incentive effects of 
obesity-related laws have been of interest to health economists and 
policymakers ex post, even if the laws did not explicitly target obesity.  
For instance, because they would raise the cost of high-calorie drinks to 
consumers, soda taxes are often considered as an anti-obesity strategy, 
even though at first, some of the taxes were “applied primarily for 
revenue generation.”48  Typically, when evaluating the policy incentives, 
the outcomes of interest are related to body weight.  In this vein and 
drawing from previous analyses of sin taxes on cigarette and alcohol 
consumption, studies have documented that state-level soda taxes49 
decrease soda consumption by children and adolescents while increasing 
their consumption of other high-calorie products;50 the links with 
obesity rates are unclear.51 
Likewise, states, school districts, and schools vary in their health 
policies governing, among others, school breakfast and lunch choices, 
healthy food preparation, junk food advertising, physical education, and 
nutrition education.52  Each of these policies would shift incentives, 
 
 48. Lisa M. Powell et al., Associations Between State-level Soda Taxes and Adolescent Body 
Mass Index, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S57, S58 (2009). 
 49. Soda tax rates range from zero to seven percent, with a mean tax rate of 3.43% in grocery 
stores and 4.02% through vending machines.  Soda tax rates vary by state, with the majority of states 
levying a tax on soda sold in grocery stores or through vending machines.  Id. 
 50. Jason M. Fletcher, David E. Frisvold & Nathan Tefft, The Effect of Soft Drink Taxes on 
Child and Adolescent Consumption and Weight Outcomes, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 967, 973 (2010). 
 51. See Daniel Kim & Ichiro Kawachi, Food Taxation and Pricing Strategies to “Thin Out” the 
Obesity Epidemic, 30 AM J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 430, 432–33 (2006) (finding a link between repealing 
a soda or snack food tax and higher obesity prevalence but no statistically significant relationship 
between state soda tax rates and adult obesity rates); Powell et al., supra note 48, at S57 (finding 
statistically insignificant relationships between soda tax rates and adolescent BMI and only a weakly 
significant relationship with the “BMI among teens at risk for overweight”). 
 52. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SCHOOL HEALTH POLICIES AND 
PROGRAMS STUDY 2006 (2006); available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/shpps/2006/factsheets/pdf/FS_Overview_SHPPS2006.pdf. 
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often through higher or lower economic costs.  For example, requiring 
that reduced-price school lunch programs offer skim milk in addition to 
whole milk53 would lower the costs of a healthier diet because the 
person could more easily obtain the skim milk at the reduced lunch rate 
rather than paying a higher price at a supermarket, as well as paying for 
gasoline and time.  How exactly is providing cheaper skim milk serving 
a “deterrent function”?  Quite simply, this policy makes it easier to 
comply with healthy eating goals and discourages unhealthy eating by 
increasing the relative cost of choosing whole milk when skim milk is 
now just as inexpensive.  An analogous reasoning applies to state 
regulations on dietary and nutrition education in schools, which Part 
III(B) discusses. 
2. Obesity Stigma and the Expressive Function of Laws 
The critiques of the anti-obesity campaigns suggest that such laws 
might express messages about acceptable behaviors or physical 
appearances independently of their direct incentives or penalties.  In 
assessing whether or not obesity-related laws shift social norms, this 
Article focuses on the social acceptance and stigma that obese persons 
experience amid such laws. 
It is no secret that for some time, obese persons have been regarded 
with disdain in American society, facing stereotypes such as being lazy, 
lacking self-control, and lacking intelligence.54  In schools, anecdotes of 
obese children being the victims of taunts and bullying based on their 
weight are common.55  Obese students also mention feeling 
dissatisfaction about their body sizes compared to societal ideals.56  At 
work, obese persons often experience bias based on their weight and 
appearance in the form of more severe wage penalties and employment 
 
 53. For example, as of 2006, 6 states and the District of Columbia require that schools to offer 
three or more different types of milk for lunch, and 12 states recommend it.  CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, STATE-LEVEL SCHOOL HEALTH POLICIES AND PRACTICES: A STATE-BY-
STATE SUMMARY FROM THE SCHOOL HEALTH POLICIES AND PROGRAMS STUDY 2006, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/shpps/2006/summaries/pdf/State_Level_Summaries_SHPPS2006.pdf 
 54. Puhl & Heuer, supra note 40, at 1019. 
 55. Studies have documented students’ tendencies to bully their overweight peers.  See Julie C. 
Lumeng et al., Weight Status as a Predictor of Being Bullied in Third Through Sixth Grades, 125 
PEDIATRICS e1301 (2010); Ian Janssen, Wendy M. Craig, William F. Boyce & William Pickett, 
Associations Between Overweight and Obesity with Bullying Behaviors in School-Aged Children, 113 
PEDIATRICS 1187 (2004); Richard S. Strauss & Harold A. Pollack, Social Marginalization of 
Overweight Children, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 746 (2003). 
 56. See, e.g., Kristen Harrison, Ourselves, Our Bodies: Thin-Ideal Media, Self-Discrepancies, 
and Eating Disorder Symptomatology in Adolescents, 20 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 289 (2001); 
Janet D. Latner et al, Stigmatized Students: Age, Sex, and Ethnicity Effects in the Stigmatization of 
Obesity, 13 OBESITY RESEARCH 1226 (2005). 
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barriers on average;57 the wage penalties are especially pronounced 
among white women who are obese.58  Obese patients are also more 
likely to face derogatory comments and negative attitudes from doctors, 
nurses, and other medical workers in health care settings.59 
In view of the stereotypes about obese people, it is plausible that an 
anti-obesity policy could adversely affect their positions relative to the 
government’s desired norms.  Indeed, psychologists have conducted 
smaller experimental studies to determine the causes of bias against 
obesity, which could inform anti-obesity policies and their 
consequences.  Other researchers have found that cues emphasizing the 
internal, controllable causes of obesity worsened negative attitudes 
about obesity,60 while cues emphasizing external factors such as 
genetics improved attitudes.61  In fact, the framing of cost-equivalent 
incentives can matter to health policymakers looking to navigate stigma.  
An online experiment indicated that increasing health care premiums for 
overweight persons signaled negative messages about being overweight, 
while providing a credit of the same dollar amount for non-overweight 
persons did not signal such messages to participants in the experiment.62  
As such, these findings could help justify critics’ arguments that the 
aggressive anti-obesity educational campaigns would worsen obesity 
stigma, with their cues blaming obese people for being unable to control 
their behaviors.  However, the small-scale experimental results have 
been mixed,63 and the expressive roles of actual laws on norms remain 
untested in larger populations. 
 
 57. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting and Coping with Weight 
Stigma: An Investigation of Overweight and Obese Adults, 14 OBESITY 1802 (2006); John Cawley, The 
Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 451 (2004). 
 58. See Cawley, supra note 57, at 457; S. Averett & S. Korenman, Black-White Differences in 
Social and Economic Consequences of Obesity, 23 INT’L J. OBESITY 166, 166 (1999). 
 59. See Puhl & Heuer, supra note 3, at 943–47 (2009). 
 60. Rebecca M. Puhl, Marlene B. Schwartz & Kelly D. Brownell, Impact of Perceived 
Consensus on Stereotypes About Obese People: A New Approach for Reducing Bias, 24 HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. 517, 523 (2005). 
 61. Christian S. Crandall, Prejudice Against Fat People: Ideology and Self-Interest, 66 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 882 (1994). 
 62. See David Tannenbaum, Chad L. Valasek, Eric D. Knowles & Peter H. Ditto, Work 
Wellness Programs: Sticks Send Stigmatizing Signals 12–13 (manuscript), available at 
https://webfiles.uci.edu/dtannenb/www/documents/Stick%20paper.pdf. 
 63. See, e.g., Stephen K. Bell & Sam B. Morgan, Children’s Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions 
Toward a Peer Presented as Obese: Does a Medical Explanation for the Obesity Make a Difference?, 
25 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 137 (2000) (finding that information explaining obesity had mixed effects on 
children’s attitudes towards obese peers); Bethany A. Teachman, Kathrine D. Gapinski, Kelly D. 
Brownell, Melissa Rawlins & Subathra Jeyaram, Demonstrations of Implicit Anti-Fat Bias: The Impact 
of Providing Causal Information and Evoking Empathy, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 68, 68 (2003) (finding 
higher bias when subjects were told that obesity was mainly caused by overeating and lack of exercise, 
but not lower bias when subjects were told that obesity was mainly due to genetic factors). 
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B. Dietary Behaviors & Nutrition Education Laws 
To test the law and economic theories of social norms, this Article 
analyzes dietary behaviors and nutrition education policies, which vary 
across states.  By 1994, 69% of states required high schools to offer 
instruction on dietary behaviors and nutrition as part of their health 
education curricula.64  According to a survey of high school health 
teachers, this most likely includes teaching about “nutrients and the 
foods where they are found (72.7%), choosing healthy meals and snacks 
(72.6%),” as well as teaching about “social pressures to be thin (66.8%)” 
and “healthy weight management (63.2%).”65  Appendix Table 9 
summarizes the laws by state. 
There are several reasons to focus on nutrition education laws when 
testing legal theories of social norms.  First, incentives to eat healthily 
are embedded in the laws.  All other things equal, nutrition education in 
schools would reduce the time spent on seeking information and lower 
the overall cost of information and, at least at the margin, make it easier 
to make healthier decisions and achieve a healthy weight.  Put another 
way, they make unhealthy diets relatively less attractive and in theory 
could “deter” obesity.66  Next, as with the recent anti-obesity awareness 
campaigns, the nutrition education laws can potentially have expressive 
effects, making implicit statements about body weight that can 
stigmatize obese people.67 
Third, the laws apply specifically to adolescents in schools, where 
 
 64. Janet L. Collins, Robert S. Gold, Laura Kann, Lloyd J. Kolbe, Beth Collins Patemen & Meg 
Leavy Small, School Health Education, 65 J. SCH. HEALTH 302 (1995).  The state policies do not 
prescribe specific materials that a class must cover, nor do any require a separate, self-contained class 
devoted solely to diet and nutrition, though individual districts and schools have discretion to devise 
additional guidelines.  See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, SCHOOL HEALTH POLICIES 
AND PROGRAMS STUDY, available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/shpps/1994/pdf/main.pdf  
(reporting that 80% of districts require nutrition be taught, and 84% of schools include education on 
dietary behaviors and nutrition in their curricula). 
 65. Id. at 309. 
 66. Studies have linked nutrition education with dietary behaviors and knowledge, physical 
activity, attitudes, or physical health indicators such as BMI.  See, e.g., Alicia Raby Powers, Barbara J. 
Struempler, Anthony Guarino & Sondra M. Parmer, Effects of a Nutrition Education Program on the 
Dietary Behaviors and Nutrition Knowledge of Second-Grade and Third-Grade Students, 75 J. SCH. 
HEALTH 129 (2005); Carmen Pérez-Rodrigo & Javier Aranceta, School-Based Nutrition Education: 
Lessons Learned and New Perspectives, 4 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 131, 136 (2001); Yannis Manios, 
Joanna Moschandreas, Christos Hatzis & Anthony Kafatos, Evaluation of a Health and Nutrition 
Education Program in Primary School Children of Crete over a Three-Year Period, 28 PREVENTATIVE 
MED. 149 (1999); F. Angelico, M. Del Ben, L. Fabiani, P. Lentini, F. Pannozzo, G.C. Urbinati & G. 
Ricci, Management of Childhood Obesity Through a School-Based Programme of General Health and 
Nutrition Education, 105 PUB. HEALTH 393 (1991). 
 67. My own tabulations of student-level data merged with the state-level data on nutrition laws 
show a strong positive correlation between states that require nutrition education and students reporting 
that they learned about the health problems of obesity in school. 
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social norms are prominent and networks in schools can be very 
influential.  As sociologist Robert Crosnoe argues, “[T]he valence and 
intensity of cultural messages vary considerably across specific pockets 
of this mass culture.  As a bounded, identifiable setting of adolescent 
life, the school is an appropriate unit for considering local contexts of 
youth culture.”68  Furthermore, researchers have linked peer influence 
and social norms to eating behaviors.69  Others have also documented 
differences in perceived norms about healthy eating habits in some 
nutrition education interventions, concluding that these programs 
encourage young people’s acceptance of healthy food choices.70  Still, 
whether or how actual norms about obesity (and the social acceptability 
of obese persons themselves) shift in the wake of laws presents a ripe 
empirical question and a highly relevant application in testing legal 
theory. 
How exactly could nutrition education laws have expressive effects?  
First, consider the analogous example of sex education laws and their 
controversy.  A rationale for mandating sex education in public schools 
is to lower the costs of safe sex by providing information.  At the same 
time, according to the information-updating model proposed by 
McAdams, as well as Benabou and Tirole, the laws might communicate 
that teen sex is (or should be) the norm, which critics worry would 
encourage students to have more sex (protected or not), independently 
of the effect of more information about contraceptives.71  Following this 
information-updating framework, nutrition education laws would lower 
the costs of achieving a healthy weight by providing information.  At the 
same time, the law itself communicates to students that being 
overweight or obese should not be the norm, independently of its effect 
in lowering the information costs of losing weight. 
C. Summary of Predictions 
To spell out the analytical framework more concisely, an anti-obesity 
law should have direct incentive effects for obese or overweight persons 
to lose weight.  Healthier diets, more exercise, lower obesity rates, or 
 
 68. Crosnoe, supra note 8, at 244. 
 69. See, e.g., Marla E. Eisenberg et al., The Role of Social Norms and Friends’ Influences on 
Unhealthy Weight-Control Behaviors Among Adolescent Girls, 60 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1165 (2005); 
Patricia Pliner & Nikki Mann, Influence of Social Norms and Palatability on Amount Consumed and 
Food Choice, 42 APPETITE 227 (2004); J.G. Maeland & L.E. Aaro, The Theoretical Basis for Health 
Education in Medical Practice, 113 TIDSKRIFT FOR DEN NORSKE LAEGEFORENING 51 (1993). 
 70. See, e.g., Tom Baranowski et al., Gimme 5 Fruit, Juice, and Vegetables for Fun and Health: 
Outcome Evaluation, 27 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 96, 96–97 (2000). 
 71. Indeed, Lessig notes that beyond conveying information, “education can alter social 
meaning[].”  Lessig, supra note 13, at 1022. 
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lower average BMIs could serve as evidence of incentives at work in an 
anti-obesity, nutrition education policy.  A “pro-obesity” or “obesity-
friendly” law should have the opposite incentives regarding weight-
related behaviors. 
Obesity laws can have expressive functions that shift social norms 
regarding obesity.  This can be represented by an increase in the social 
stigma of obese persons under anti-obesity law.  Applying the belief-
updating model,72 an anti-obesity law such as a dietary education 
mandate reveals information that the norm is a lower body weight than 
what individuals previously believed it to be.  On average, people then 
update their beliefs and adjust their dietary or weight-related behaviors 
to conform to the norm.  People who remain obese, however, are now 
even further away from the norm of lower body weight and experience 
greater stigma.73 
D. Mechanism: Personal Responsibility 
Several mechanisms might explain how laws could shift norms 
regarding obesity.  The most obvious is that policymakers intentionally 
make anti-obesity policy to generate social stigma against the obese as a 
shaming device to discourage unhealthy behaviors.  The billboards in 
Georgia come to mind in proclaiming that obesity is undesirable.  In this 
way, social stigma is used as a direct deterrent, since it adds to the 
psychic costs of being obese.  But most policies, including nutrition 
education requirements as well as the White House’s “Let’s Move” 
campaign do not so blatantly vilify the population. 
A second and more plausible mechanism specific to obesity is related 
to a tacit (or not so tacit) emphasis on individual choices as a major 
cause of obesity.  While many factors can contribute to obesity, public 
health communications cite individual behaviors leading to energy 
imbalance—consuming too many calories while not expending enough 
physical activity—as “the bottom line.”74  And with escalating health 
care costs, obesity is commonly approached as an economic problem 
where weight gain stems from individual choices.75  Strong popular 
 
 72. See McAdams, supra note 11; Benabou & Tirole, supra note 19. 
 73. A finding that anti-obesity laws do not decrease obesity rates would not dispel the validity of 
the laws’ expressive effects.  Diet and exercise behaviors may be more reasonable measures of anti-
obesity effort rather than changes in body weight.  If laws express more focus on weight loss through 
dietary effort, then weight norms could become lower despite no visible changes in obesity rates. 
 74. Defining Overweight and Obesity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 8, 
2012, 5:55 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/causes/index.html; What are Overweight and Obesity?, 
NAT’L HEART LUNG AND BLOOD INST. (Sept. 8, 2012, 5:59 
PM),http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/obe/obe_causes.html. 
 75. Tomas Philipson & Richard Posner, Is the Obesity Epidemic a Public Health Problem? A 
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sentiments attributing obesity to poor personal choices were especially 
prominent amid the controversy over fast food class action litigation, 
which charged fast food companies with inflicting obesity-related harms 
in connection with people’s consumption of their products.76  The 
“American Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act,” the 
House’s response to the fast food litigation in 2004, barred lawsuits 
against restaurants claiming that their food made people fat and 
undeniably voiced the idea that people were overweight due to their own 
choices.77  These attitudes are consistent with conclusions from some 
researchers that “[s]ociety regularly regards obese persons not as 
innocent victims, but as architects of their own ill health, personally 
responsible for their weight problems because of laziness and 
overeating.”78 
In light of the sentiments above, anti-obesity policies could further 
influence how society associates individual choices with obesity.  
Promoting personal responsibility in managing body weight, then, is a 
reasonable mechanism for a law’s expressive effects on obesity stigma.  
Anti-obesity laws such as nutrition education mandates and soda taxes 
target choices in diet and physical activity by directly incentivizing 
healthier behaviors or deterring unhealthy ones.  Recall the belief-
updating framework, which predicts that obesity stigma arises when (1) 
the law expresses that the norm should be a lower body weight, (2) 
 
Decade of Research on the Economics of Obesity (NBER, Working Paper No. 14010, 2008) (stating that 
obesity is not only a public health issue but also an economic problem, where caloric intake and 
expenditure are functions of individual choice). 
 76. For discussions comparing fast food obesity claims with tobacco litigation, see Richard A. 
Daynard, Food Litigation: Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2179 (2002); 
Joseph P. McMenamin & Andrea D. Tiglio, Not the Next Tobacco: Defenses to Obesity Claims, 61 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate 
Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361 (2005); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. 
Brennan, Obesity—The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2601 (2006); Kelly 
D. Brownell & Kenneth Warner, The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions 
Died. How Similar Is Big Food?, 87 MILBANK Q. 259 (2009). 
 77. Chairman of the Judiciary Committee Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-WI) declared, 
“This bill says, Don’t run off and file a lawsuit if you are fat . . .  It says, Look in the mirror because 
you’re the one to blame.”  Carl Hulse, Vote in House Offers a Shield in Obesity Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
11, 2004, at A1. 
 78. Puhl & Heuer, supra note 40, at 1020.  The following Internet post is an example of this 
sentiment: 
Even when most people are made aware of the health dangers of foods, they keep on 
eating the garbage foods anyway!  People must certainly know that ice cream and soft 
drinks promote obesity, and yet you see it time and time again at the supermarket: loads 
of ice cream tubs and 12-packs of soft drinks in the shopping carts of 300-pound people 
who can barely squeeze into the checkout lanes.  Clearly, this is a personal responsibility 
problem: these people need to stop making excuses and start making better choices about 
foods and groceries. 
Mike Adams, Is Obesity a Choice or a Disease?, NATURALNEWS.COM, July 19, 2004, 
http://www.naturalnews.com/001416.html. 
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people update their beliefs and behaviors to adjust to the lower weight 
norm, and (3) people who remain obese experience more stigma as they 
are now further from the norm.  Under a policy expressing that the norm 
should be a lower weight via making healthier and more responsible 
choices, obese persons become negatively perceived as lazier, or 
exerting less effort in maintaining a lower weight than their non-obese 
peers.  Thus, society accepts or stigmatizes a person based on weight, at 
least partly because anti-obesity law implies that heavier weight is due 
to the person’s own bad choices. 
A very basic separating equilibrium model with information 
asymmetry can illustrate views about personal responsibility in obesity 
stigma.79  Because of obesity laws (i.e., dietary behaviors and nutrition 
education policy), society values people who follow the lower weight 
norms as making more responsible choices.  In this simplified model, 
people who are closer to the low weight norm will minimize their 
stigma.  Becoming thinner; however, requires a costlier investment of 
effort in diet, exercise, and time.  Here, there are two types of people: 
“Type I” and “Type II.”  For various genetic, economic, or 
environmental reasons, the costs of losing weight are lower for Type I 
and higher for Type II. 
Figure 1 depicts the cost curves for Type I and Type II, as well as the 
payoffs that they would receive in society from minimizing stigma given 
the effort they invest in losing weight.  Type II faces cost curve cII, 
which is steeper than the cost curve cI of Type I.  The equilibrium effort, 
y*, is the social norm’s amount of health effort that is more likely to 
translate into some visible weight loss for Type I than for Type II.  For 
both, when society observes effort y < y*, the gross benefit of avoiding 
stigma is w2. 
 
 79. This framework adapts Nobel economist Michael Spence’s groundbreaking signaling model, 
which characterizes education as a costly credential that only high ability workers will invest in, to 
convey information to employers that they are intrinsically more productive than low ability workers.  
See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973). 
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prejudices against obese persons, I propose this as a plausible model for 
policies that express messages about body weight norms while targeting 
individual choices. 
E. Heterogeneity of Expressive Effects: Pre-Existing Social Norms 
The expressive effects of laws can vary depending on pre-existing 
norms, whether determined by culture, genetics, or other factors.  To 
illustrate this, consider again the simple model from before.  Here, I 
show examples of how the initial distribution of Type I’s and Type II’s 
(whose costs differ due to genetics, culture, and socioeconomic 
circumstances) can make a difference in the stigma effects of the law.  I 
argue that being saliently obese, or being one of the few obese persons 
among most people who are not obese, worsens stigma.  Meanwhile, 
being relatively less obese, or being obese among many others who are 
also obese, lessens stigma. 
Consider a society with more Type I’s than Type II’s.  An anti-
obesity law directly changes the incentives or costs of losing weight.  
Because the majority of people are Type I, they will internalize the costs 
and lose weight, resulting in a lower weight norm.  With fewer Type 
II’s, it becomes easier to spot the remaining obese persons and attribute 
their status to poor personal choices.  Here, the law has shifted the 
weight norm downward, so to remain obese is more salient amid a 
population that is generally thinner.  Due to the law’s expressive effects, 
obese persons experience more stigma because they are further from the 
norm. 
But now consider a society with many more Type II’s than Type I’s.  
Since it is far costlier for Type II’s to lose weight (due to genetics, 
economic circumstance, etc.), many more people in this society will 
remain obese despite an anti-obesity law.  Hence, it appears that the law 
does not shift the weight norms as much.  As a result, being obese would 
be less stigmatizing because obese persons are closer to the heavier 
weight norm than if the law had shifted the norm to a lower body 
weight. 
In concluding this Part, by providing an additional means to separate 
the population based on traits that were previously unobservable, a law 
that gives more benefits to potentially thinner people than heavier 
people would induce a further separation among the population and 
associations of perceptions of their unobserved qualities (such as 
“laziness”) based on weight.  Those persons who remain obese are 
 
(2005).  This explanation is consistent with the model that I have described, which posits that those 
fewer persons who remain obese after a law is enacted might experience worse stigma because they are 
viewed as exerting less effort. 
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viewed as “lazy,” which worsens their stigma.  In this way, the law 
expresses the value that obese persons should be less worthy. 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This Part empirically analyzes the relationship between norms and 
obesity-related laws, using state dietary behaviors and nutrition 
education requirements as anti-obesity law.  The inquiry focuses on 
adolescent female students attending schools across the United States in 
the mid-1990s.  I note that social networks are especially influential 
among this age and gender group,82 and deviating from weight norms 
can have more acute effects on adolescent girls.  I use the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health, whose data on high school 
friendship networks and self-reported feelings of social acceptance are 
good for measuring social stigma, and whose data on educational 
outcomes allow me to assess how obesity stigma matters to economic 
well-being in the long run.  Using this data, I estimate differences in 
stigma and educational outcomes experienced by obese versus non-
obese female students corresponding to the obesity-related laws. 
The main purpose of this analysis is to produce empirical estimates 
that can confirm or challenge the social norm hypotheses of expressive 
law and economics.  The basic empirical strategy relies on cross-
sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to estimate 
differences in individual outcomes across states with varying obesity 
laws.  To minimize biases from variables that can correspond to 
location, school, or family background, the regressions control for 
demographic, school-level, and neighborhood characteristics.  This 
regression is a standard technique used in empirical law and social 
sciences.83  In implementing this, my analysis offers original evidence 
that links stricter anti-obesity laws with more obesity stigma. 
In developing the empirics, I also consider the “personal 
responsibility” mechanism to explain obesity stigma that follows from 
anti-obesity laws.  I find that dietary education laws correspond with 
some increased health efforts and little to no decrease in obesity.  These 
patterns are consistent with anti-obesity laws that emphasize healthy 
personal choices, highlighting the role of “personal responsibility” in 
one’s weight.  Furthermore, higher cigarette taxes correspond with 
higher rates of obesity in general, suggesting that cigarette taxes might 
be interpreted as a de facto “obesity-friendly” law.  Finally, to 
understand whether or how obesity laws shift norms, I consider pre-
 
 82. See Peggy C. Giordano, Relationships in Adolescence, 29 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 257 (2003). 
 83. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 861 (3d ed. 2006). 
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existing norms and find that the law’s expressive effects vary by peer 
groups with different underlying norms. 
Some caveats should be noted when interpreting the results.  First, the 
goal of the analysis is to determine whether a relationship between 
obesity-related laws and obesity stigma exists as predicted by theory.  
As such, the reader’s focus should be on signs and statistical 
significance; the magnitudes of stigma or exactly how much norms shift 
are not the main concern of this study.  Second, the estimates from the 
basic cross-sectional regression model are merely suggestive of the 
social norm influences of obesity laws.  A true experiment in varying 
laws across identical groups of people would be preferred in establishing 
causation.  As is typical in many empirical studies, short of conducting a 
randomized controlled experiment, regression estimates can be 
susceptible to biases from reverse causality or omitted variables.  With 
obesity laws, reverse causality (endogeneity) should not be a problem 
under the common assumption that state-varying laws are enacted 
exogenously, and therefore, provide a “natural experiment” for 
evaluating the effects of policy on individual behaviors.84  While the 
assumption that laws are exogenous is controversial,85 it is highly 
plausible that reverse causality is not an issue here—current social 
stigma outcomes of obese youth are not motivating past changes in state 
anti-obesity policies during this time period.  However, omitted variable 
bias, or failing to account for unobserved characteristics or underlying 
time trends, can make it more difficult to infer causality from cross-
sectional models.86  I employ some techniques and robustness checks to 
address this, which I describe in the next subparts. 
 
 84. It is reasonable that obesity stigma is unlikely to be directly motivating policymakers to enact 
dietary education laws, and even less likely to be motivating changes in state cigarette tax rates.  State 
variation in laws is generally accepted among empirical law and economics scholars as a sufficient 
“natural experiment” for identifying causal effects on people’s behaviors.  See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & 
Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 407, 411 (2003) (observing that state variation in “[a]bortion 
legalization provides a natural quasi experiment to determine the effect of abortion availability on STD 
incidence”); Jonathan Gruber & Michael Frakes, Does Falling Smoking Lead to Rising Obesity?, 25 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 183 (2006). 
 85. It is important to point out that assumptions that state laws vary exogenously may be 
inaccurate. Through the political process, people lobby for policy changes to satisfy their preferences, 
such that an economic or social trend may instead be driving a change in the law. See, e.g., Timothy 
Besley & Anne Case, Unnatural experiments? Estimating the incidence of endogenous policies, 110 
ECON. J. F672 (2000). Thus, an increasing trend in crime may inspire policymakers to enact laws with 
tougher criminal sanctions.  Indeed, preexisting norms can predict legal precedent and can therefore 
determine how states may regulate in areas such as obscenity or property law. See Daniel L. Chen & 
Susan Yeh, Distinguishing Between Custom and Law: Empirical Examples in Property and First 
Amendment Precedents, 21 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. (forthcoming 2013). 
 86. See, e.g., WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 83, at 13–14. 
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A. Data 
1. The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health 
This analysis uses the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent 
Health (Add Health), a nationally representative survey that asks 
detailed questions on health, peer networks, and education.87  Clustered 
sampling occurred first at the school level, in which 80 high schools and 
their 54 feeder middle schools were selected following a stratified 
sampling scheme designed to be representative of U.S. schools 
according to region, urbanicity, school type, size, and ethnicity.  The 
schools range in size from twenty-five to 2,559 students.  In 1994–1995, 
all students in these schools received an in-school questionnaire, which 
asked basic questions about their race, parental education, and other 
demographic traits.  Next, under a scheme of stratified sampling by race, 
age, and sex within each school, seventeen female and seventeen male 
students per grade per school were randomly selected for the 
longitudinal study, which consist of very detailed in-home and parental 
interviews.  In 16 schools, all enrolled students were followed 
longitudinally as part of Add Health’s “saturated sample.”  Respondents 
were enrolled in grades 7–12 at the first longitudinal survey in 1994–
1995 (Wave 1).  Follow-ups occurred in 1996 (Wave 2), and 2001–2002 
(Wave 3).  In addition to standard data on demographic and 
socioeconomic background, these longitudinal surveys include sensitive 
data on friendship networks, health outcomes, and school transcript 
grades, among others.  About 15,000 sample individuals were followed 
from Wave 1 through Wave 3.  Of these, about 3,700 students are in 
Add Health’s saturated sample, which spans 16 representative states. 
The variables for my analysis are drawn from the In-Home 
interviews, since both obesity and stigma variables are available only in 
this component of Add Health.  To measure obesity, I create an obesity 
indicator variable using the Centers for Disease Control’s definitions, 
which relies on computing a BMI from height and weight.88  To measure 
 
 87. The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER: 
ADD HEALTH (Sept. 8, 2012 7:06 PM), http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth (machine-readable 
data file and documentation).  Add Health is a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris and 
designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National 
Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal 
agencies and foundations.  Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for 
assistance in the original design.  Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on 
the Add Health website. Id.  No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis. 
 88. Doctors routinely screen for obesity by measuring one’s body mass index (BMI), which is 
the ratio of weight in kilograms to squared height in meters.  Individuals over age 20 are classified as 
obese (BMI ≥ 30), overweight (30 > BMI ≥ 25), normal (25 > BMI ≥ 18.5) and underweight (BMI < 
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social stigma, I use friendship network data and self-reported social 
acceptance.89  In the friendship network data, I focus on three different 
variables: (1) the number of students whom the respondent names as a 
friend (out-degree friends); (2) the number of students who name the 
respondent as their friend (in-degree friends); and (3) an index of 
popularity that is commonly used in social network analysis (proximity 
prestige).90  Additionally, I create socioeconomic controls for family 
income, parent’s marital status, and parental education from the parental 
In-Home interview in Wave 1.91 
Because my analysis considers pre-existing norms or peer effects, I 
need to create cohort-level variables based on characteristics of students 
in each grade at the sample schools, to control for otherwise unobserved 
 
18.5)).  CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_bmi/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).  
Because BMI and body fat increase dramatically with age among youth, I follow the Centers for Disease 
Control’s procedure of using age–sex growth charts of a reference population in the 1970s to compute 
BMI percentiles for youth ages 7 to 20.  CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr025.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).  Using these BMI 
percentiles, the CDC defines youth individuals as “obese” (BMI percentile ≥ 95), “overweight” (95 > 
BMI percentile ≥ 85), “healthy weight” (85 > BMI percentile ≥ 5), or “underweight” (BMI percentile < 
5). I use the obese indicator in my main specifications. I also check specifications that use the 
continuous BMI variable. 
 89. I re-code “social acceptance” as a variable with values ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 
corresponds to feeling the least socially accepted, and 5 corresponds with feeling most socially accepted.  
In the In-Home survey, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the statement, “You feel 
socially accepted,” with 1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = disagree; 5 = 
strongly disagree. I flip the original variable’s coding. 
 90. “Prestige” identifies important actors within a social network, meaning that the actor is 
named by many others as a friend (popular), but she initiates few relations herself.  “Proximity” refers to 
how closely other people in the network can reach the actor directly and indirectly.  “Proximity 




where Ii = influence domain of i, which is equal to the number of other people who can reach i;  
g = number of nodes in X; 
d(nj, ni) = distance between actor j to actor i. 
 91. Parental education is constructed as the higher of the mother’s or father’s years of education.  
In the parental interview module, an interviewer administered a written questionnaire to the youth’s 
mother or other parent/guardian if the mother was unavailable.  I impute missing values using those 
available for another youth in the same family, replace the remaining missing values with the mean 
values by the birth years of the sample adolescents, and flag the imputed observations with indicators; 
flagged observations range from 14.8 percent (married indicator) to 25.7 percent (family income) of the 
youth in the original survey.  Missing values for race and academic outcomes were not imputed.  
Estimates are robust whether simply omitting the observations with missing values from the analysis or 
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differences across peer groups.  For the cohort-level measures in my 
main specifications, I rely on Add Health’s saturated sample, where 
obesity measures (among others) are available for all students in the 
schools.92  Most of the social norm outcome variables are available in 
Wave 1, but educational attainment is measured in Wave 3.93  To 
maintain a consistent analysis sample, I restrict the analysis to saturated 
sample observations with non-missing values for BMI, non-missing 
race, and non-missing longitudinal sample weights for analysis across 
waves of the survey. 
2. Obesity Laws 
I use the state-level dietary behaviors and nutrition education 
requirements as a measure for anti-obesity law.  These state policy 
variables come from the 1994 School Health Policies and Programs 
Study.94  The state law variable is coded as an indicator for whether the 
state requires its schools to offer “dietary behaviors and nutrition 
education.” Appendix Table 1 shows that thirty-one states had these 
requirements; of the sixteen states represented in my analysis sample, 
ten states had these requirements.  Parts of the analysis use state 
cigarette taxes to check for the robustness of the main results.  State 
excise taxes on cigarettes per pack (in cents) as of 1995 come from the 
CDC State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) 
System.  State cigarette tax rates range from 3 cents to 56 cents in the 
analysis sample. 
3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the analysis sample of 
female respondents in Add Health.  The main analysis sample includes 
 
 92. Obesity variables are not available in the in-school survey given to all students in the 134 
schools.  To include more schools, constructing cohort-level measures using the non-saturated 
longitudinal sample is an alternative, but these would be based on small samples within the school and 
are susceptible to measurement error and attenuation bias. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC 
ANALYSIS 84–86 (5th ed. 2003).  I also check my regressions using the non-saturated sample but get 
very noisy estimates, as expected. 
 93. The years of education variable was constructed from responses to a Wave 3 question that 
asked for the “highest grade or year of regular school” completed.  I re-code years of education to 
account for type of degree earned and/or institution attended using the typical value for years of 
education corresponding to the highest degree earned as recommended by Park (1996).  This re-coding 
affects 13 percent of the sample.  See generally Jin Heum Park, Measuring Education Over Time: A 
Comparison of Old and New Measures of Educ[a]tion from the Current Population Survey, 50 ECON. 
LETTERS 425 (1996). 
 94. See Michael T. Errecart et al., Methodology, 65 J. SCH. HEALTH 295 (1995). 
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1,131 observations from sixteen schools.95  Of the female students, 9.9% 
were obese, 15.7% were overweight, 69.9% were normal weight, and 
4.5% were underweight according to Wave 1 (1994–1995) measures of 
height and weight.96  School sizes range from thirty to 1,744.  The 
average student attended a school with 532 students.  Of the sample, 
75% attended a school in an urban area, and 24.5% attended a private 
school.  Nationally representative longitudinal probability weights and 
corrections for clustered sampling by school and stratification by region 
were applied to all estimates. 
B. Econometric Model 
To start, consider equation (1), the basic econometric model: 
 
(1)  yijs = 1Laws*Obeseijs +2Laws +3Obeseijs +4Xijs +ijs 
 
where the subscripts denote individual i, school j, and state s.  Here, 
yijs is the outcome variable for social stigma or educational attainment.  
Laws is the state obesity law variable, i.e., dietary behaviors and 
nutrition requirements.  Obeseijs is a dummy variable indicating whether 
the individual is obese.  Xijs is a vector of individual demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, including the student’s race, age, family 
income, parental education, parent’s marital status.  The main 
coefficient of interest is on the interaction term Laws*Obeseijs, which 
captures the differential stigma effect that the law has on obese students, 
after controlling for the general shift in social norms among all students 
due to the law (using Laws) and the stigma that obese students already 
feel without the law (using Obeseijs).  This model is a cross-sectional 
OLS regression that controls for a number of individual, family, and 
school characteristics that could otherwise bias estimates of the law’s 
role in shifting social norms.97 
 
 95. The longitudinal sample, which I use in a robustness check but lacks the variables for social 
network analysis, includes 10,227 observations from 132 schools. 
 96. The youth obesity prevalence in this sample is somewhat lower than the commonly cited 
statistics and trends based on national data from the Centers for Disease Control.  See Cynthia L. Ogden, 
Katherine M. Flegal, Margaret D. Carroll & Clifford L. Johnson, Prevalence and Trends in Overweight 
among U.S. Children and Adolescents, 1999-2000, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1728 (2002) (reporting 
obesity prevalence rates based on the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey). 
 97. Despite this, I acknowledge that the OLS model can be susceptible to omitted variable biases 
that can understate or overstate a law’s effect.  Unobserved background traits of individuals may be 
correlated with whether or not they experience a particular law.  For example, families that are very 
health conscious and disdainful of body fat might prefer to live in states with more stringent dietary 
education requirements.  A greater concentration of families with lower weight norms could be a major 
explanation for observing greater obesity stigma in states with anti-obesity laws.  Failing to account for 
such family traits can lead a researcher to over- or under-attribute stigma or other outcomes to the law.  
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A model of how laws shift social norms should consider pre-existing 
norms.  Thus, the next step is to test for whether the law’s expressive 
effects on obesity stigma vary by different underlying norms.  However, 
a challenge is that students and their families might tend to self-select 
their peers and underlying norms, which could bias any estimates of 
peer effects.  To alleviate this bias, I adapt the cohort-differences model 
that labor economists have previously implemented using Add Health to 
estimate peer effects on academic outcomes.98  This technique uses 
variation in pre-existing peer norms based on how many students of a 
particular culture (e.g., white students or obese students) randomly 
appear above or below their expected numbers in a particular grade in a 
school.  In other words, this method maintains that while students’ 
characteristics may determine where they live or which schools they 
attend, exactly how many white (or obese) students are present across 
different grades within the same school is exogenous.99 
To adapt this method,100 I observe that weight norms differ by peer 
groups—having more white students in one’s grade within the school 
worsens stigma, while having more obese students lessens it—and I use 
the variation across cohorts’ demographic composition to assess how 
stigma from the law varies by different pre-existing norms.  In defining 
underlying norms, I use white peers as one proxy for culture, based on 
published findings that weight standards may differ between whites and 
racial minorities.101  I use obese peers as another proxy for culture 
because the number of one’s peers who are obese may signal a higher 
pre-existing weight norm, as I explained in Part IV.102  Being obese 
 
A common solution is to use panel data, or data from the same individuals collected at multiple periods 
over time, and then control for individual fixed effects, or all time-invariant unobserved characteristics 
that are specific to an individual.  Then one would infer that changes in outcomes are due to changes in 
the laws over the years.  I try implementing this individual fixed effects model, but there is not enough 
power for estimation in Add Health, because the state obesity laws change for only a handful of the 
individuals during the survey years.  Also for this reason, I do not implement the differences-in-
differences estimator to evaluate the effects of laws that vary across states and over time, which is 
another standard technique in empirical law and economics. 
 98. See Robert Bifulco, Jason M. Fletcher, & Stephen L. Ross, The Effect of Classmate 
Characteristics on Post-Secondary Outcomes: Evidence from the Add Health, 3 AM. ECON. J: ECON. 
POL’Y 25 (2011); see also Victor Lavy, M. Daniele Paserman & Analia Schlosser, Inside the Black Box 
of Ability Peer Effects: Evidence from Variation in the Proportion of Low Achievers in the Classroom 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14415, 2008); Caroline Hoxby, Peer Effects in the 
Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 7867, 2000). 
 99. Bifulco et al., supra note 98. 
 100. I do not control for the within-school fixed effects exactly according to the Hoxby or Bifulco 
et al. method (which focus on peer effects and not law effects).  Doing so in my case would cause 
collinearity problems with the state law variables. 
 101. See, e.g., Latner et al., supra note 56; Christian S. Crandall, Prejudice Against Fat People: 
Ideology and Self-Interest, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 882 (1994). 
 102. Cf. Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social 
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while surrounded by more peers who are obese may lessen stigma that 
may arise from being saliently heavier than others. 
Equation (2) is the main specification in estimating whether obesity 
laws influence obesity stigma, taking into account pre-existing norms: 
 
(2) yijs =  1Laws*Obeseicjs*PeerNormcjs + 2Laws*Obeseicjs   
   + 3Obeseicjs*PeerNormcjs + 4Laws*PeerNormcjs  
   + 5Laws + 6Obeseicjs + 7PeerNormcjs  
   + 8Xicjs + 9Schoolj + 10Cohortc + ijs 
 
where PeerNormcjs is the vector of variables denoting the percentage 
of students in cohort c at school j who are white or who are obese, and 
Schoolj is a vector of school characteristics including school size, public 
or private status, urbanicity, and region.  The coefficient 3 on the 
interaction between Obeseicjs and PeerNormcjs measures how obese 
students fare as the percentage of white peers (or obese peers) increases; 
I define this the pre-existing obesity norm.  The main coefficient of 
interest is 1 on Laws*Obeseicjs*PeerNormcjs, which reveals how the 
law’s influence on obesity stigma varies by pre-existing obesity norms 
as defined by peer groups. 
C. Results 
Tables 2 through 8 display the results of my regression analyses.  The 
primary goal is to empirically establish whether or not a relationship 
exists between obesity laws and obesity norms that would be consistent 
with predictions of expressive law and economic theories.  As such, the 
signs and statistical significance of the estimates are the focal points in 
these tables. 
1. Main Estimates of the Relationship Between Laws and Stigma 
Table 2 shows the relationship between state dietary behaviors and 
nutrition education laws and obesity stigma, applying OLS estimation to 
equation (1).  In this table, an indicator for whether the respondent is 
obese during the first wave of the survey (1994–1995) serves as the 
obesity measure.  Each column shows results for one of four different 
outcome variables that can proxy for social stigma: self-reported 
feelings of social acceptance in school; number of students naming the 
respondent as their friend, number of students the respondent names as 
her friend, and proximity prestige, all of which proxy for one’s status 
 
Network Over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (2007) (finding that being surrounded by obese 
peers corresponds to higher obesity probabilities). 
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within the school’s social network.  First, note that holding all other 
variables equal, obese girls have fewer friends than non-obese girls, with 
2.969 fewer schoolmates naming an obese respondent as their friend 
(column 2), where the mean respondent in the sample has 5.647 friends 
(see Table 1).  An obese adolescent girl having fewer friends would be 
consistent with the negative social perceptions of obese persons in the 
United States, as documented by Puhl and Heuer (2009).103  Interpreting 
the coefficient on the Obese indicator variable, in states with no dietary 
education requirements, the social acceptance of obese girls does not 
statistically differ from that of non-obese girls. 
The expressive influence of anti-obesity law on obesity stigma 
corresponds to the coefficient on the interaction term between the 
dietary education law variable and the obesity indicator.  The -0.467 
coefficient on the interaction, which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level, means that in states with dietary education requirements, obese 
girls are less socially accepted than non-obese girls.  In other words, the 
level of social stigma (in terms of social acceptance) from obesity is 
worse under an anti-obesity law.  There is no statistically significant 
difference in the number of friends or proximity prestige. 
The results in Table 2 support theories that obesity-related laws could 
shift obesity norms on average (not taking into account pre-existing 
norms).  I acknowledge that although the specifications attempt to 
control for individual, family, and school characteristics, the coefficients 
may still be over or underestimated due to omitted variable biases.  For 
example, there may be unobservable factors that drive obese students 
with social outlier personalities to begin with to sort into states with 
dietary education requirements, lower cigarette tax rates, or both.  In this 
example, not controlling for the unobserved factors may lead me to 
over-attribute stigma effects to obesity law. 
2. Robustness Checks 
Table 3 examines how the estimated relationship between obesity 
laws and obesity stigma changes when removing and adding a variety of 
controls, or measuring body weight with BMI instead of an obesity 
indicator.  This exercise can be informative of the results’ sensitivity to 
omitted variable bias.  Column 1 shows the estimates of the influence of 
dietary behaviors and nutrition education laws when excluding school-
level characteristics and cohort dummies.  In column 2, these controls 
are added back and the estimates here are identical to the first coefficient 
in column 1 of Table 2.  The estimates for the laws are robust whether 
 
 103. See generally Puhl & Heuer, supra note 3. 
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including or removing school characteristics, which are plausibly 
correlated with individual preferences for location or school type.  I also 
compare results using BMI instead of an obese indicator variable.  
Dietary education laws continue to have stronger, negative impacts on 
weight stigma (column 5 of Table 3). 
Column 3 of Table 3 shows how sensitive the estimates are when 
including both the dietary education laws and the cigarette tax rates in 
the regression.  There are two reasons for checking this.  First, if the 
omitted variables correlated with dietary education laws are also 
correlated with state-specific health policy climates as reflected in 
cigarette taxes, including cigarette taxes would help minimize bias on 
the estimates for dietary education laws.  Second, dietary education 
requirements as anti-obesity law and cigarette taxes as obesity-related 
laws104 may have some competing effects on obesity norms.  It can be 
cleaner to estimate the effect of an anti-obesity law, holding the 
relatively obesity-friendly cigarette tax constant.  When including both 
laws, dietary education laws continue to worsen obesity stigma; the 
coefficient of -0.533 is similar and slightly larger in magnitude than if 
tax rates were excluded. 
A policy goal of anti-obesity laws is to directly reduce obesity rates.  
If nutrition education laws reduce the number of obese people, then the 
fewer students who remain obese become more salient, as they are now 
heavier relative to their peers.  Thus, changes in the number of people 
engaging in a behavior discouraged by the law may increase stigma for 
people who persist in that behavior.105  Still, Column 4 of Table 3 
verifies that the main findings of obesity stigma are robust when 
including a control for the percentage of students who are obese per 
school. 
3. Robustness Checks Using an Obesity-Friendly Policy 
To further establish that obesity stigma outcomes arise from anti-
obesity expressions of anti-obesity law, I compare results using state 
cigarette tax rates.106  It is possible that the mere fact that an obesity-
related law was enacted will be linked to behaviors in a particular 
direction, regardless of which side the law favors.107  Analyzing a health 
 
 104. See infra Part IV(C)(3). 
 105. Cf. Funk, supra note 81. 
 106. Appendix Table 9 lists state cigarette excise tax rates as of 1995. 
 107. See, e.g., Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, Growth Under the Shadow of Expropriation? The 
Economic Impacts of Eminent Domain 50 (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.duke.edu/~dlc28/papers/EminentDomain.pdf at 50  (finding that regardless of the case’s 
resolution, the appearance of an appellate regulatory takings case leads to higher property values in the 
locality of the original regulation in the long run, and the reason may be due to [u]nobserved factors that 
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law that is a placebo or that has tacitly obesity-friendly incentives can 
help verify that stigma outcomes arise from the anti-obesity values 
expressed by nutrition education laws rather than from the mere 
presence of having any law with incentives related to body weight.108  
Cigarette taxes are useful, as they represent health-related consumption 
laws that are not immediately associated with raising obesity awareness 
but, as discussed below, have been linked with obesity rates. 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 show that higher cigarette tax rates are 
correlated with a higher likelihood of being obese.  This result aligns 
with existing studies.  On the margin, higher cigarette tax rates can 
increase the costs of losing weight (or maintaining a lower weight) by 
smoking.109  Popular belief holds that smoking can help one lose weight 
and that quitting smoking would lead to weight gain; these views follow 
from findings that smoking increases metabolism and suppresses 
appetite.110  Further, the link between cigarette policy and obesity has 
been of interest to health economists, with studies finding evidence that 
higher cigarette taxes (or higher cigarette prices) lead to higher obesity 
rates.111  In theory then, the higher costs that consumers must pay to 
purchase cigarettes can be a deterrent to losing weight or maintaining a 
lower weight via smoking, so that state cigarette excise taxes might even 
be considered to be a rough proxy for “obesity-friendly” laws in their 
 
correlate with the land being worth litigating over). 
 108. Cf. id.  See also Chen, Levonyan, & Yeh, supra note 15, at 16 (estimating the effects of pro-
choice appellate decisions on political preferences and estimating the effects of pro-life or conservative 
decisions as a robustness check). 
 109. According to the 1986 Adult Use Tobacco Survey, 27% of smokers who had tried to quit 
“reported that ‘actual weight gain’ was a ‘very important’ or ‘somewhat important’ reason why they 
resumed smoking” and “[f]orty-seven percent of current smokers and 48 percent of former smokers 
agreed with the statement that ‘smoking helps control weight.’”  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL ix 
(1990), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBCV.pdf. 
 110. Indeed, in 1990 the U.S. Surgeon General concluded from a review of fifteen studies that that 
“four-fifths of smokers who quit gained weight after cessation,” and the people who quit smoking 
gained about 4 pounds more on average than non-quitters.  Id. at ix.  The quitters’ increased weight 
persists for up to 6 years or more before decreasing to the weight level of those people who never 
smoked before.  Paul. Froom et al., Smoking Cessation and Body Mass Index of Occupationally Active 
Men: The Israeli CORDIS Study, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 718, 720–21 (1999); Tetsuya Mizouea et al., 
Body Mass Decrease After Initial Gain Following Smoking Cessation, 27 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 984 
(1998). 
 111. See Shin-Yi Chou, Michael Grossman, & Henry Saffer, An Economic Analysis of Adult 
Obesity: Results from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 23 J. HEALTH. ECON. 565, 568–
69 (2004); Inas Rashad & Michael Grossman, The Economics of Obesity, 156 PUB. INTEREST 104, 108–
09 (2004); Charles L. Baum, The Effects of Cigarette Costs on BMI and Obesity, 18 HEALTH ECON. 3 
(2009). But see Gruber & Frakes, supra note 84, at 183 (finding a negative relationship between 
cigarette taxes and body weight); Charles Courtemanche, Rising Cigarette Prices and Rising Obesity: 
Coincidence or Unintended Consequence?, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 781 (2009) (arguing that over time, 
higher cigarette prices corresponds with lower BMI, which is partly due to effects on exercise and food 
consumption). 
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deterrent roles.  Observing higher obesity rates amid higher tax rates 
would be consistent with the tax’s deterrent effect on weight loss.112  
It is reasonable to predict that a law that makes it costlier to lose 
weight would either have no effect on or lessen the stigma of obese 
persons.  On the margin, weakly “obesity-friendly” tax rates should 
leave weight norms unchanged if being overweight were already the 
norm or should shift weight norms towards being heavier.113  Table 4 is 
similar to Table 2 and shows the relationship between state cigarette tax 
rates and weight stigma, using BMI to measure body weight.114  The 
takeaway here is that obesity-friendly taxes weakly correspond with 
heavier weight norms, which supports the idea that obesity stigma 
outcomes arise from anti-obesity expressions of anti-obesity law rather 
than from the mere presence of any health-related consumption law.  
Higher cigarette taxes correspond with a marginally greater social 
acceptance of girls who have higher BMIs, compared to their social 
acceptance amid lower cigarette tax rates.  In column 1 of Table 4, the 
coefficient on the interaction of cigarette tax rates and BMI is positive 
though weakly significant at the 10% level.  Amid higher tax rates, each 
unit of increase in BMI corresponds with an improvement in social 
acceptance (by 0.000582 points) over the baseline penalty (of -0.0258) 
in social acceptance that the same person would experience amid lower 
tax rates. 
This weak decrease in obesity stigma contrasts with the greater 
obesity stigma under dietary behaviors and nutrition education policy.  
That an increase in tax rates corresponds to little or no reduction in 
weight stigma is consistent with the predictions that anti-obesity law 
shift weight norms downward, while a law with some obesity-friendly 
price incentives but no obvious announcement about body weight 
should not. 
 
 112. It would also be consistent with increases in efforts to quit smoking or decreases in smoking, 
all of which have been linked to weight gain (or at least not weight loss). 
 113. It is plausible that higher cigarette taxes, which discourage smoking by making it more 
expensive, could also affirm heavier weight norms.  The confluence of popular perceptions, advertising, 
and research linking smoking with weight, as well as simply increasing the cost of a weight loss method, 
suggest that cigarette taxes could express a normative statement about the body weight, even though it 
may not intentionally speak about obesity as do dietary education mandates or a “fat” tax.  Here, the 
popular perception that smoking helps one lose weight or stay thin could be at work.  Note also that 
tobacco companies have a long history of advertising cigarettes with sleek imagery and associating 
smoking with slender figures.  See, e.g., F. Senaida Fernandez et al., Cigarette Advertising in Magazines 
For Latinas, White Women, and Men, 1998–2002: A Preliminary Investigation, 30 J. COMMUNITY 
HEALTH 141, 141–42 (2005); Alyssa N. Zucker et al., Smoking in College Women: The Role of Thinness 
Pressures, Media Exposure, and Critical Consciousness, 25 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN QUARTERLY 233, 
234–35 (2001). 
 114. Here, instead of an obesity indicator variable, I use BMI as a measure for body weight, 
because cigarette taxes are indirect obesity-friendly laws that may affect behaviors at a different margin 
than laws that explicitly address body weight. 
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4. Direct Incentives and Health Effort  
Recall that the incentive effects of dietary behaviors and nutrition 
education requirements predict that more people would adopt healthier 
habits and obesity rates would decline if people previously were at 
unhealthy weights.  Table 5 sheds light on the incentive effect by 
showing estimates for the relationship between obesity laws and health 
effort.  Columns 1 and 3 show that students in states with dietary 
behaviors and nutrition education requirements eat breakfast more 
frequently, an average of 2 more days than students in states without the 
requirements.  However, the policy has no statistically significant 
correlation with the students’ physical fitness (columns 4 and 6).  Table 
6 shows linear probability estimates of the relationship between the 
policies and the likelihood of being obese.  Dietary education 
requirements and higher cigarette taxes correspond with a higher 
likelihood of obesity in 1994–1995, but the relationship weakens in 
1996.  Columns 2 and 4 show that higher cigarette tax rates correspond 
to higher obesity probability, which supports the predicted incentive 
effects of obesity-friendly policies and is also consistent with published 
findings by Chou, Grossman, and Saffer (2004) and Baum (2009).115  
However, the results for dietary education policies do not support 
policymakers’ intentions that the anti-obesity law would incentivize a 
decrease in obesity. 
The effort model where obesity is perceived as a signal of bad 
individual choices does not require obesity rates to change.  The 
increased frequency of eating breakfast reflects greater efforts to 
improve one’s health (though additional calories from breakfast do not 
necessarily result in weight loss).  Therefore, under dietary education 
policies, health effort increases and obesity rates are unchanged, but 
social stigma worsens for obese girls.  This pattern of results is still 
consistent with the predictions of the personal responsibility mechanism 
in obesity stigma, where the anti-obesity law promotes making better 
choices in health effort, but in doing so encourages society to further 
stigmatize obese people who are seen as making bad choices. 
5. Heterogeneity and Pre-Existing Social Norms 
I next analyze how obesity stigma arising from laws would vary by 
pre-existing social norms, or the composition of one’s peers.  Here, I 
address the hypothesis that the composition of one’s peer group can 
affect how much a law may increase one’s stigmatization.  Suppose the 
 
 115. Chou et al., supra note 111; Baum, supra note 111. 
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law shifts the weight norm downward.  Amid a population that is 
generally thinner, being obese becomes a more salient feature.  As a 
result of the law’s expressive effects, obese persons in a group of thinner 
peers may experience more stigma because the law causes them to 
appear even further away from the norm. 
To address the role of one’s peers in the data, I apply equation (2) and 
show coefficients on anti-obesity law, obesity, and cohort (peer) 
composition variables in Table 7.  The main coefficients of interest in 
Tables 7 are on the three-way interactions of the law, obesity measure, 
and the cohort composition variables.  But first, observe that the other 
displayed coefficients are themselves informative of the expressive 
theory.  In Table 7, the coefficients on Law*Obese reveal that under that 
anti-obesity law, obese girls have fewer friends in school (columns 2–3).  
To control for the pre-existing norms in the regressions, I include both 
the percentage of a cohort that is white and the percentage that is obese 
within each school (%White and %Obese, respectively).  The coefficient 
on Obese*%White is negative and statistically significant for the number 
of friends and proximity prestige (columns 2–4 of Table 7).  In other 
words, at the baseline, obese girls experience more social stigma as the 
percentage of their classmates who are white increases.  This pattern is 
consistent with anecdotal and published assertions that pressures to be 
thin are greater among white people, compared to other races.116  In 
contrast, the coefficient on Obese*%Obese is positive for the number of 
friends and proximity prestige, meaning that at the baseline, obese girls 
experience less social stigma as they are surrounded by more obese 
classmates. 
I find that obesity stigma arising from dietary behaviors and nutrition 
education policies lessens as obese peers increase.  To interpret the 
coefficients, for every percentage point increase in obese classmates, 
obese girls under the policy have 73.4 more friends, which cancels out 
the loss of 20.28 friends at the baseline where there are fewer obese 
peers (column 3).  Admittedly, these are extreme magnitudes.  But the 
pattern of signs and statistical significance support the theoretical 
prediction that obesity stigma will be mitigated when the underlying 
population norm is dominated by obese persons who have difficulty 
losing weight (despite the law making it less costly to do so).117  
Surprisingly, as white peers increase, obese girls have more friends 
 
 116. See, e.g., Andrea D. Powell & Arnold S. Kahn, Racial Differences in Women’s Desire to be 
Thin, 17 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 191 (1995); Marisol Perez & Thomas E. Joiner, Jr., Body Image 
Dissatisfaction and Disordered Eating in Black and White Women, 33 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 342 
(2003); Linda J. Neff et al., Black—White Differences In Body Size Perceptions And Weight 
Management Practices Among Adolescent Females, 20 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 459 (1997). 
 117. These persons would be the “Type IIs” in the separating equilibrium model.  See infra Part 
III(E). 
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under dietary behaviors and nutrition education law.  This implies that 
some pre-existing norm represented by more white peers counteracts the 
law’s average stigma effects. 
6. Educational Consequences and Policy Implications 
On average, obesity stigma worsens under anti-obesity laws.  A 
natural question to ask is, so what?  Can these stigma effects in high 
school translate to welfare losses or worse socioeconomic outcomes in 
the long run?  To briefly mull possible longer-term implications of these 
social norm consequences, I analyze educational attainment as an 
exercise.  Figure 2 plots the raw distribution (kernel density) of years of 
education separately in four groups, by obese or normal weight 
classification and by dietary behaviors and nutrition education policy.  
The spike at twelve years of education, which most closely corresponds 
to a high school diploma, is highest for obese females.  At higher years 
of education, the kernel densities for obese females are markedly lower 
than for normal weight females. 
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by this anti-obesity law. 
Curiously, education decreases as exposure to white classmates 
increases.  While anti-obesity law’s relationship with educational 
attainment of obese students seems counterintuitive given its opposite 
relationship with social stigma, it is not unreasonable that more social 
stigma might prompt a positive academic response, and more social 
acceptance might prompt a negative academic response.119  For 
example, a higher level of stigma could mean fewer social activities and 
instead, more time to devote to academics. 
Though these findings have mixed policy implications, they remain 
important dimensions when evaluating optimal legal rules.  First, the 
data show that an anti-obesity law can shift norms and further stigmatize 
obese girls in school, in terms of poorer social acceptance, fewer friends, 
or worse social status.  However, the social stigma does not necessarily 
translate to worse educational outcomes.  In the data, stigma may be 
inversely related with educational attainment.  If an initial goal of anti-
obesity law was to promote healthier behaviors for economic purposes, 
then the law could also be beneficial if educational attainment improves, 
given that more education improves wage outcomes120 as well as health 
outcomes.121  On the other hand, other mechanisms may be at play so 
that social stigma at school could be less relevant to college attendance. 
This does not rule out the idea that obesity stigma in adolescence 
could affect one’s future well-being in ways unrelated to college 
attendance.  Psychological stress and bullying, including those 
associated with weight stigma, might leave lasting impressions into 
adulthood.122  Moreover, laws expressing values against obesity could 
also encourage negative perceptions that persist over time, which would 
do little to lessen the discrimination that obese people already face in 
society and the stress that accompanies it.123  In these cases, 
implementing anti-bullying legislation to acknowledge weight-based 
harassment of children, or anti-discrimination laws that discourage 
 
 119. See, e.g., Robert Crosnoe & Chandra Muller, Body Mass Index, Academic Achievement, and 
School Context: Examining the Educational Experiences of Adolescent at Risk of Obesity, 45 J. HEALTH 
& SOC. BEHAV. 393 (2004); King-To Yeung & John Levi Martin, The Looking Glass Self: An Empirical 
Test and Elaboration, 81 SOC. FORCES 843 (2003). 
 120. See generally David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
LABOR ECONOMICS 1801–63 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds. 1999). 
 121. See David M. Cutler & Adriana Lleras-Muney, Education and Health: Evaluating Theories 
and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econs. Research, Working Paper No.12352, 2006). 
 122. See, e.g., Stephen Allison et al., Does School Bullying Affect Adult Health? Population 
Survey of Health-Related Quality of Life and Past Victimization, 43 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 1163 
(2009); Gemma L. Gladstone et al., Do Bullied Children Become Anxious and Depressed Adults?: A 
Cross-Sectional Investigation of the Correlates of Bullying and Anxious Depression, 194 J. NERVOUS & 
MENTAL DISEASE 201 (2006). 
 123. Cf. Puhl & Heuer, supra note 3. 
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weight-based discrimination may be appropriate policy responses to 
temper the unintended social norm effects of anti-obesity laws intended 
to improve public health.  Still, whether or not the law’s social norm 
effects translate into wage inequalities and long-term health problems 
and what to do about it remain open questions that deserve full 
investigation beyond the scope of this Article.  Further work is needed 
to better understand the long-term consequences of obesity laws and 
stigma. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article applies an expressive law and economic framework to 
analyze timely concerns about the consequences of obesity laws on 
obesity stigma.  I find empirical evidence linking stricter anti-obesity 
laws with worse obesity stigma, supporting the legal theory that laws 
shift social norms and generate stigma by expressing values beyond 
their original incentive effects.  These analyses and results contribute 
much-needed evidence to an area where legal theory is rich but few 
empirical studies exist. 
Using a unique dataset of social networks in schools, I find that where 
dietary education laws are stricter, social stigma increases for the 
remaining obese girls, though obesity rates do not decrease.  Moreover, 
pre-existing norms are important; I find that the law’s expressive role in 
obesity stigma can vary by pre-existing peer norms, where being 
surrounded by more white or being surrounded by more obese peers can 
lessen the social stigma from anti-obesity law.  I also find that efforts to 
engage in healthier behaviors are slightly greater under more demanding 
dietary education mandates, though obesity itself does not decrease.  
Together, these results are consistent with a basic economic model of 
obesity stigma in which the obese, under anti-obesity laws that 
emphasize responsible individual health choices, are negatively 
perceived as exerting less effort in their health. 
Several insights from this analysis would benefit from further 
discussion.  This Article has focused on adolescent obesity stigma 
associated with state dietary behaviors and nutrition education 
mandates, which are useful in testing for expressive effects of the law 
generally.  There is much room for research on the long-term 
consequences of this stigma, as well as developing and testing additional 
theories of how social norms might shift, beyond those discussed in this 
Article.  While this Article has explored the relationship and pathways 
between stigma and laws in detail, obtaining rigorous causal estimates, 
ideally through randomized experiments or natural experiments, would 
be the next step for evidence-based policymaking. 
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Importantly, a basic lesson from these results is that a law’s social 
norm interactions with vulnerable subgroups, such as obese women, can 
be very real and warrant further examination by policymakers.  That a 
law’s stigma consequences might vary by peer types or pre-existing 
norms suggests how complex the interactions can be between laws and 
pre-existing norms, cultural or otherwise.  Policymakers should more 
seriously consider the expressive function of public health laws, the 







Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. N 
BMI  22.202 4.712 13.332 46.934 1131 
Obese  0.099 0.299 0 1 1131 
Overweight  0.157 0.364 0 1 1131 
Normal 
weight  0.699 0.459 0 1 1131 
Underweight  0.045 0.208 0 1 1131 
White 0.774 0.418 0 1 1131 
Black 0.075 0.263 0 1 1131 
Hispanic 0.084 0.278 0 1 1131 
Asian 0.051 0.22 0 1 1131 
Other race 0.016 0.124 0 1 1131 
Age 14.672 1.72 11 21 1131 
Parent’s 
years of 
education 13.96 2.293 8 18 1131 
Family 
income 
(thousands) 47.534 28.222 0 230 1131 
Parent 
married 0.787 0.388 0 1 1131 
Northeast 0.125 0.33 0 1 1131 
West 0.243 0.429 0 1 1131 
Midwest 0.467 0.499 0 1 1131 
South 0.165 0.371 0 1 1131 
Urban 
school 0.755 0.431 0 1 1131 
Private 
school 0.245 0.431 0 1 1131 
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Large school 0.416 0.493 0 1 1131 
School size 532.437 546.114 30 1744 805 
% white in 
school 0.701 0.307 0 0.952 1131 
% white in 
cohort in 
school 0.708 0.321 0 1 1123 
% obese in 
cohort in 











as friend 5.647 3.821 0 23 805 
Proximity 
prestige 0.225 0.126 0.001 0.774 755 
Feel socially 
accepted 4.007 0.802 1 5 1128 
Years of 
education 
(Wave 3) 13.109 1.719 7 19 1130 
Attended 
college 
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Table 2. 
Relationship between Obesity Law and Stigma of  













 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dietary Behaviors 
& Nutrition 
Education Law* -0.467* 1.160 -0.217 0.131 
Obese (0.194) (1.436) (1.344) (0.0790) 
Dietary Behaviors 
& Nutrition 
Education Law -0.0225 -1.536 -1.185 -0.132 
 (0.198) (1.409) (0.792) (0.106) 
Obese 0.00947 -2.969* 0.589 -0.136+ 
 (0.178) (1.446) (1.265) (0.0788) 
Black 0.306** 1.006** -0.510 0.0806* 
 (0.0961) (0.329) (0.377) (0.0328) 
Hispanic -0.0718 3.681** 0.313 0.107** 
 (0.167) (0.814) (0.594) (0.0322) 
Asian 0.178 2.861** -0.104 0.0841** 
 (0.110) (0.507) (0.456) (0.0262) 
Other Race 0.408** 5.253** 0.831** 0.0248** 
 (0.122) (0.756) (0.254) (0.00745) 
Age -0.0381 -0.494** -0.247 0.00264 
 (0.0655) (0.177) (0.230) (0.00568) 
Parental Education -0.0453* 0.377** 0.0435 0.00564* 
 (0.0183) (0.0942) (0.0289) (0.00240) 
Family Income 0.00179 -0.00482 0.0108* 0.000120 
 (0.00116) (0.00552) (0.00437) (0.000207) 
Parents are 
Married 0.0263 -0.661 -0.105 0.00252 
 (0.103) (0.499) (0.421) (0.0191) 
Cohort 1 0 5.767** -1.309 0 
 (.) (2.134) (1.303) (.) 
Cohort 2 -0.239 0 0 -0.0676 
 (0.336) (.) (.) (0.0836) 
Cohort 3 -0.401 1.336** 0.0403 -0.0231 
 (0.243) (0.438) (0.660) (0.0910) 
Cohort 4 -0.302 2.222* -0.459 -0.105 
 (0.254) (0.927) (1.122) (0.0712) 
Cohort 5 -0.391+ 1.892+ -0.410 -0.108 
 (0.214) (1.056) (1.371) (0.0700) 
Cohort 6 -0.227 2.724** -0.742 -0.106 
 (0.260) (0.989) (1.190) (0.0652) 
Cohort 7 -0.335 2.887* -0.454 -0.102 
 (0.335) (1.288) (1.703) (0.0630) 
West 0.0224 -7.773** -4.203** -0.334** 
 (0.270) (1.506) (1.109) (0.116) 
Midwest 0.282+ -1.174** -1.255** -0.0230 
 (0.152) (0.217) (0.223) (0.0257) 
South -0.0840 -0.356+ -2.343** 0.00816 
 (0.123) (0.197) (0.218) (0.0214) 
Urban School -0.521** 2.328** 0.682* 0.126** 
 (0.177) (0.358) (0.265) (0.0334) 
Large school -0.00341 0.728 0.853 -0.0748+ 
 (0.221) (0.749) (0.819) (0.0396) 
Constant 5.621** 7.001** 9.540** 0.273 
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 (1.105) (2.000) (2.981) (0.227) 
R-squared 0.107 0.264 0.187 0.570 
Observations 999 692 692 646 
**1%; *5%; +10% significance.  Robust standard errors are clustered by school and are shown in 
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Table 3 
Robustness Checks for the Influence of Obesity Laws on Obesity 
Stigma: The Influence of Dietary Behaviors & Nutrition Education 
Laws on Social Acceptance 
 
 Dependent variable: Social Acceptance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dietary 






(0.102) (0.194) (0.236) (0.197) (0.0180) 
Obesity 
measure 





No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for 
Tax? No No Yes 
 
No No 
Control for % 
Obese in 
School? 
No No No Yes No 
R-squared 0.056 0.107 0.112 0.108 0.111 
N 999 999 999 999 999 
 
**1%; *5%; +10% significance.  Coefficients shown are on state laws interacted with obesity during 
Wave 1 (1994–1995).  Robust standard errors are clustered by school and are in parentheses.  
Regressions include controls for race, age, parental years of education, family income, marital status of 
parental respondent, and flags for imputed values of the latter three.  “Tax” refers to the state cigarette 
tax rate as of 1995.  School covariates include school size, public or private status, urbanicity, region, 
and cohort indicators. 
  
44
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/4
2012] LAWS AND SOCIAL NORMS 217 
Table 4 
Relationship between Cigarette Taxes and Stigma of 
Obese Adolescent Girls 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cigarette Tax*BMI 0.000582+ 0.000756 0.00162 -0.0000247 
 (0.000319) (0.00214) (0.00158) (0.0000350) 
Cigarette Tax -0.0153* -0.0885 -0.0803+ -0.00346 
 (0.00756) (0.0604) (0.0468) (0.00276) 
BMI -0.0258+ -0.147* -0.0441 -0.00121 
 (0.0143) (0.0658) (0.0416) (0.00115) 
Black 0.208+ -0.521 -0.604 0.0343 
 (0.124) (0.491) (0.396) (0.0396) 
Hispanic 0.0524 0.980 0.432 0.0415 
 (0.178) (1.207) (0.366) (0.0363) 
Asian 0.207+ 0.543 -0.173 0.0330 
 (0.112) (1.200) (0.423) (0.0557) 
Other Race 0.428** 5.273** 0.726** 0.0273** 
 (0.127) (0.602) (0.265) (0.00561) 
Age -0.0468 -0.491** -0.308* -0.00382 
 (0.0616) (0.168) (0.152) (0.00387) 
Parental Education -0.0195 0.122 -0.0157 -0.00281 
 (0.0257) (0.149) (0.0535) (0.00532) 
Family Income 0.00147+ 0.00728 0.00754 0.000444+ 
 (0.000837) (0.00800) (0.00513) (0.000242) 
Parents are Married -0.0362 -1.085* -0.153 -0.0190 
 (0.0894) (0.501) (0.323) (0.0124) 
Cohort 1 0 0 0 0.0426 
 (.) (.) (.) (0.0359) 
Cohort 2 -0.0571 -4.293** 0.0984 -0.0211 
 (0.359) (1.238) (0.986) (0.0302) 
Cohort 3 -0.199 -2.666* 0.417 0.0296 
 (0.295) (1.079) (1.017) (0.0305) 
Cohort 4 -0.140 -1.680 0.751 -0.0199 
 (0.250) (1.102) (0.690) (0.0142) 
Cohort 5 -0.185 -2.324* 0.828 -0.0271* 
 (0.224) (1.053) (0.738) (0.0106) 
Cohort 6 -0.0535 -1.786 0.483 -0.0204* 
 (0.228) (1.152) (0.672) (0.00954) 
Cohort 7 -0.122 -1.274 0.754 0 
 (0.266) (1.202) (1.027) (.) 
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West -0.126 -1.157 -1.372** 0.00445 
 (0.142) (1.127) (0.510) (0.0558) 
Midwest 0.106 0.257 -0.293 0.0739 
 (0.0944) (0.921) (0.676) (0.0653) 
South 0.119 -2.108* -2.165** -0.146+ 
 (0.120) (0.966) (0.716) (0.0849) 
Urban School 0 2.340** 1.876** 0.153* 
 (.) (0.689) (0.502) (0.0643) 
Private School 0.208    
 (0.127)    
Large school -0.0871 -1.581+ -1.359** -0.234** 
 (0.179) (0.857) (0.496) (0.0762) 
Constant 5.591** 18.49** 11.29** 0.426* 
 (1.485) (3.613) (2.625) (0.167) 
R-squared 0.067 0.202 0.149 0.487 
Observations 1127 805 805 755 
 
**1%; *5%; +10% significance. Robust standard errors are clustered by school and are shown in 
parentheses.  All estimates use longitudinal survey weights and adjust for stratified sampling according 
to region.  
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Table 5 
Relationship between Obesity Laws and Effort 
 
Number of Days Last 
Week Ate Breakfast 
Physically fit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




(0.477) (0.392) (0.0725) (0.0344) 
Control for Cigarette 
Tax? N Y N Y 
R-squared 0.122 0.124 0.072 0.076 







Relationship between Obesity Laws and Obesity Probability 
 
 Obese, 1994-1995 Obese, 1996 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




(0.106) (0.0530) (0.133) (0.0756) 
Cigarette Tax  0.00377*  0.00449* 
  (0.00166)  (0.00212) 
R-squared 0.038 0.048 0.050 0.061 
N 1983 1983 1020 1020 
 
 
**1%; *5%; +10% significance.  Coefficients shown are on state dietary behaviors and nutrition 
education policies and state cigarette tax rates.  Robust standard errors are clustered by school and are 
shown in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for race, age, parental years of education, family 
income, marital status of parental respondent, and flags for imputed values of the latter three.  School 
covariates include school size, public or private status, urbanicity, and region.  Data are from the Add 
Health saturated sample and are restricted to women.  All estimates use longitudinal survey weights and 
adjust for stratified sampling according to region. 
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Table 7 
Do Influences of Dietary Behaviors & Nutrition Education Law on 
Obesity Stigma Vary by Pre-Existing Norms? 











Law*Obese 0.667 -10.91* -20.28* -0.239 
 (0.484) (5.249) (9.761) (0.182) 
Law*Obese*%White -1.352 16.19** 15.21+ 0.580** 
 (0.956) (4.493) (8.467) (0.111) 
Obese*%White 0.166 -3.315** -3.646** -0.194** 
 (0.480) (1.130) (0.434) (0.0147) 
Law*Obese*%Obese -0.164 -18.07 73.40* -0.711 
 (3.937) (14.94) (30.53) (0.865) 
Obese*%Obese 2.193 11.26 6.395+ 1.535** 
 (1.996) (7.463) (3.792) (0.143) 
Obese -0.322 -1.976* 1.952** -0.206** 
 (0.290) (0.897) (0.442) (0.0188) 
Law -1.402** 0.779 -0.183 0.0499 
 (0.462) (5.224) (3.540) (0.219) 
% White -0.925* 1.142 0.895 0.0203 
 (0.407) (4.116) (3.567) (0.124) 
Law*%White 1.559** -2.575 -2.143 -0.286 
 (0.501) (5.398) (3.861) (0.191) 
%Obese -1.742 -20.89** -12.78** -1.728** 
 (1.766) (2.622) (2.427) (0.159) 
Law*%Obese 1.970 7.091 10.50** 1.674** 
 (2.051) (6.322) (3.120) (0.280) 
R-squared 0.130 0.301 0.226 0.697 
N 994 691 691 645 
 
**1%; *5%; +10% significance.  “Law” is a dummy variable for whether the state requires dietary 
behaviors & nutrition education.  
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Table 8 
Obesity Law’s stigma roles in educational attainment 
Dependent variable Years of Education Attended College High School Diploma 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) 
Cohort Measure % white % obese % white % obese % white % obese 
Law*Obese*Cohort -0.881 9.362 -1.010* -2.222+ -0.725* 1.462 
 (0.652) (6.076) (0.399) (1.244) (0.326) (1.327) 
Law*Obese 1.054* -0.815 0.554* 0.216 0.523* -0.184 
 (0.464) (0.796) (0.245) (0.140) (0.225) (0.191) 
Obese*Cohort -0.209 -2.065 0.385** 1.185** 0.140 -0.612 
 (0.352) (3.808) (0.107) (0.346) (0.129) (0.419) 
Law*Cohort 1.272 -2.802 0.673** -0.193 1.258** -0.118 
 (1.010) (3.226) (0.250) (0.741) (0.292) (0.441) 
Law -1.529+ -0.607 -0.515* -0.0274 -1.377** -0.372* 
 (0.922) (0.597) (0.214) (0.194) (0.257) (0.170) 
 
 
Obese -0.443** -0.305 -0.0977+ -0.189* -0.100 0.0180 
 (0.130) (0.520) (0.0535) (0.0735) (0.0618) (0.0677) 
Cohort -1.887* 1.546 -0.529** 0.331 -0.616** 0.531** 
 (0.872) (2.449) (0.196) (0.227) (0.164) (0.202) 
R-squared 0.247 0.239 0.230 0.224 0.342 0.311 
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Table 9 
State Anti-Obesity Laws and Cigarette Excise Tax Rates 
State 
Tax 
(cents per pack) 
Dietary Behaviors & Nutrition 
Education Required? 
Alabama 16.5 Yes 
Alaska 29  
Arizona 58  
Arkansas 31.5 Yes 
California 37  
Colorado 20  
Connecticut 50  
Delaware 24 Yes 
District of 
Columbia 65  
Florida 33.9 Yes 
Georgia 12 Yes 
Hawaii 60 Yes 
Idaho 28  
Illinois 44 Yes 
Indiana 15.5 Yes 
Iowa 36 Yes 
Kansas 24 Yes 
Kentucky 3  
Louisiana 20  
Maine 37  
Maryland 36 Yes 
Massachusetts 51  
Michigan 75  
Minnesota 48 Yes 
Mississippi 18 Yes 
Missouri 17 Yes 
Montana 18 Yes 
Nebraska 34  
Nevada 35 Yes 
New Hampshire 25 Yes 
New Jersey 40  
New Mexico 21  
New York 56 Yes 
50
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/4
2012] LAWS AND SOCIAL NORMS 223 
North Carolina 5 Yes 
North Dakota 44  
Ohio 24 Yes 
Oklahoma 23  
Oregon 38  
Pennsylvania 31 Yes 
Rhode Island 61 Yes 
South Carolina 7 Yes 
South Dakota 33  
Tennessee 13 Yes 
Texas 41 Yes 
Utah 26.5  
Vermont 44 Yes 
Virginia 2.5 Yes 
Washington 81.5  
West Virginia 17 Yes 
Wisconsin 44 Yes 
Wyoming 12 Yes 
State average 32.7  
Federal excise tax 24  
Combined federal 
and state average 56.7  
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